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CHAPTER I 
THE RISE OF NATIONALI SM I N ASIA 
The meeting of the Asian-African Conference in 
Bandung, Indonesia in April, 1955 was a climax in the 
struggle between European colonial powers and the newly 
independent nations of Asia and Africa. After many dec-
ades of foreign domination the people of Asia and Africa 
threw off European control by creating the same political 
environment used so successfully by the European powers 
for centuries. The rise of nationalism in Asia and Africa 
and subsequent decline of Rajahs, Sultans and other local 
political leaders who co-operated with the West, ushered 
in a new, perilous era for two-thirds of mankind. 
If this new political balance had emerged at a 
time when the rest of the world was at peace, its di-
rection would, perhaps, have turned inward toward eco-
nomic development and improvement. However, the end 
of World War II did not bring the end of conflict. The 
rise of the bi-polar struggle has placed many of these 
newly independent countries in alliance with their 
former masters; others have come under a far more ab-
solute imperialism, international communism. A third 
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group has chosen neutralism. 
In order to understand the nature of the 
Asian Revolution and the forces which called forth 
the Bandung Conference it is necessary to examine 
first one of the most eKplosive ideas of man, nation-
alism. The environment which conditioned the growth 
of nationalism in Asia also played an important role 
in the foreign policy of many Asian nations after in-
dependence. 
The twentieth-century colonial environment pro-
vided Asian students and political leaders with an 
opportunity to read of Jefferson and Rousseau and the 
Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson. The two World Wars 
of the century greatly weakened the European powers and 
created a political vacuum in much of the "Non-European" 
world. 
Nationalism and religion have been the two most 
explosive social forces in the history of man. Religion 
is as old as man himself, whereas, nationalism spread 
from 18th Century Europe to engulf most of the world by 
by the middle of the twentieth century. Nationalism, 
like religion, reflected the character of the Asian peo-
ple it represented. 
At the very time nationalism was proving to be 
inadequate for the European powers who first created it, 
the peoples of Asia and Africa were using it as a tool 
to force the Europeans out of Asia and Africa. 
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The League of Nations attempted to curb nation-
alistic ambitions but f a iled , and the nations of Europe 
again went to war. At the clo se of the second war in a 
gene r ation , t he European powers were helpless to defend 
their overseas t erri tories against the rising tide of 
nationalism. And so the paradox; a growing internationa l 
concerne with gui d i ng nationa lism among the big powers 
and an ever changing political climate with new voices 
demanding in the name of self-determination, to be heard. 
Several factors provided stimulant for Asian 
nationalism. One important factor was the economic prob-
lems which followed the end of colonial occupation. In 
the rice-growing countries, the European rulers intro-
duced the commercial system of rice cultivation which 
altered the growi ng of rice from a practice aimed primar-
ily at self-sufficiency to one of export and profit. This 
demanded additional labor, and Asian immigrants were 
brought in, resulting in the influx of Chinese and Indians 
into Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, and other countries. 1 This 
naturally po sed a problem of unemployment and competition 
with the natives so that Asian nationalism also en-
tertained a certain amount of antagonism against these 
1 
Emerson R. and Thompson V. Government a nd N to al m 
in Southeast Asia , inst . of Pacific Relations, New 
York, 1952), p. 139 
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immigrant populations. In brief, this economic dis-
location and radical change served to stimulate na t ion-
2 a l ism. 
An earlier stimulant to Asian nationalism was 
t he Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Russia had tradition-
a lly been regarded in Asia as a European power. The 
Russian army suffered numerous defeats on its Eastern 
fronts, and the government was forced to sign a set-
tlement with Japan. This was used by the Japanese as 
a propaganda issue to make the Asian countries aware 
of the victory as a triumph of the East over the West. 
" When Japan defeated Russia in 1904 and thereby showed 
that an Asian nation could defeat a great European 
power by adapting and improving the Western techniques 
of war, the victory sent a wave of pride through Asia~3 
A third factor which influenced Asian national-
ism was Western education of Asians. In India and Burma 
the quality of education which the British extended to 
se lected elements of the native populations was fairly 
high. Such an education naturally included the ideas of 
freedom, democracy, and liberty along with explanations 
of the French and American revolutions. In the long run, 
2 
Ball, w. M. N al sm and Comm ism in Sout eat Asia 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1956, p. 5. 
3..lb.1g., p. 15. 
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t his made the nationalists, especially the students, more 
aware of their state of subjection. The differences be -
twe en what was preached and what was practiced was obvious 
and jarring. Thus, it is natura l that in many countries i n 
East Asia, the nationalist movements started from youth 
and student elements. 4 Western education also had an i m a c t 
on the economic aspects of nationalism. This was in the 
creation of an unemployed "educated" class of young mal-
contents, who had been trained only for the clerical pro-
fessions. The type of education which the British gave 
to the youth of colonial areas was to prepare them to join 
the civil service or to take up administrative and clerica l 
positions . When the nwnber of available jobs had been 
filled, there emerged a great number of unemployed "in-
t ellectuals." It was inevitable that they would become the 
nucleus of the nationalistic movements . 5 
The fourth factor which stimulated the national-
ist movements in Asia and Africa was President Woodrow 
Wilson's doctrine of self-determination. Wilson's Four-
teen Points stimulated the thinking of Asian leaders parti-
cularly because he was a spokesman for a nation which had 
itself thrown off colonialism. 
4.rayne, Robert , The Revolt of Asia (New York : John Day 
Co~, 1947) , p. 8-9 . 
5Vinack, H. M., Far Eastern Politics in Postwar Period 
(New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1956) , p. 314. 
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An historic co-incid ence made the colonial 
Asian countries look to Japan in the 1930's. While 
the est was in the depths of economic depression 
Japan was expanding her power in China at the ex-
pense of Europ ean interests there. In terms of for-
eign military adventures, the prestige of Japan was at 
its peak when the influence of the West was hampered by 
economic depression. This contrast caused many Asian 
nationalists to look to Japan as the leader of Asia, 
and provided an indirect stimulant to nationalism. The 
intensive propaganda which the Japanese launched before 
World War II was designed to appeal to racial and nation-
alistic sentiments. Japan's "co-prosperity" slogan was 
particularly directed to the countries und er European 
colonial control . 
Another factor by which the Japanese contrib-
uted to the rise of nationalism was the military train-
ing given to nationalists during the Japanese occupa-
tion of their countries in World War II. After the 
surrender of Japan in 1945 much of the arms and amuni-
tion still in the hands of the Japanese army fell into 
the hands of nationalists. It is well known that num-
erous guerilla units were organized into effective 
fighting forc e s during the war i n Indonesia, Burma and 
Vietnam. These units later offered strong resistance to 
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the British , French and Dutch forces when they at-
tempted to reestablish control after the Japanese sur -
r ender . 6 
Thi s re sis t ance was possible because of the 
training pr ovided earlier by the Japanese . When t hese 
"nationalists" revolted agains t t he Japanese, t he a l lies 
parachuted hug e quantitie s of ar ms and ammuni tion where 
ever possible to them. Afte r the surrender of Japan, 
the combination of training and arms constituted a 
f ormidable bargaining position f or the anti-colonial-
ists.7 
The nationalis t movements which r eached frui-
tion i n the post war pe r iod had their individual be-
ginnings at various times. Of these, the Chinese rev-
olut ion under Sun Yat-sin wa s of the greatest import-
ance. Sun Yat-sen established the Kournintang and form-
ulated the San Min Chu I, the Three Principles of the 
People, which were to act as a gui de in the rise of 
Chine se nationalism for the next fourty years. 
6 
Rosinger, L. K. & Associates. T~e State of Asia; A 
Contemporary Survey (New York . Akfred A. Knopf, 
191+7), p. 7. 
7v1nacke, .QQ. ill• p. 316. 
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In January, 1919 he called upon "Chinese 
Patriots" to follow his example in taking the fol-
lowing oath: 
I truthfully and sincerely take thi s 
public oath tha t from t his moment I will 
destroy the old and build up the new, and 
fight for the self-determination of the 
people, and will apply all my strength to 
the support of the Chinese Republic and 
the realization 0 8 democracy through the Three Principles . 
A hundred years earlier India had begun to 
ferment under British rule. There British policy and 
methods first aroused the desire for individual liberty 
and self-government. 
In India, the All Congress Party, the vanguard 
of Indian nationalism, was formed in 1885. Later, under 
the leadership of Mahatma Ghandi, it followed a policy 
of passive r esistance until i ndependence was achieved. 
It i s notable that this party was not only occupied in 
the struggle for national emancipation, but also against 
the social shackles resulting from the cast system and 
the economic leve l of the general populace . From the 
standpoint of nationalism, it will be observed that 
the All Congress Party became the champion of r eg ionalism 
in Asia in 194-7 . 
For the first time in Asian History the Congress 
created a public pla tform for voicing political aspirations. 
It represented a na tion as a whole, and above all, 
Vinacke, .QQ. ~- p. 4-7. 
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mod i fied the problems of r ace and cas t e , of r e ligion, 
l anguage , and province. During t he f ormative year s, 
t he l eader ship of the Congr e s s wa s in t he hands of men 
who followed the "liber a li sm0 of the Wes t. 
However, i n the t wentieth century the l eader-
ship of the Congr e ss shifted to the radical Indo-phils 
whose first leader wa s Bal Gandahar Tilak . Tilak turn-
ed for inspiration to the Hindu past and appealed to 
the orthodox masses arousing a fierce, semi-religious 
nationa lism. Tilak's work was later modified and di-
r ected toward non-violence by t he Indian National 
Congre s s under the leadership of Mahandas Karamchand 
Ghandi. 9 
In Burma, the nationalist movement started in 
the 1920 ' s with the first stud ents' boycott against the 
British, and the formation of the General Council of 
Buddhist Associations. The peasant rebellion of 1931 , 
and t he student strike of 1936 were the outstanding 
milestones in the history of nationalism in Burma . 
After 1945, the Anti-Fascist People ' s Freedom Lea gue, 
und er the leadership of Aung San and U Nu, agitated for 
independence , which the British granted in 1948 . 
In the early 1900's the emphasis of Indonesian 
nationalism, except for its Pan- Islamic and Modernist 
9 
Ball , W. M • .QQ ill• p. 97. 
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Islamic currents, was cultural rather than politicai. 10 
In early 1942, the we&k, half-hearted defense 
put up by most Dutch land forces against the invading 
Japanese made a tremendous impression on the Indones-
ians.11 On February 14, 1942, the Japanese attacked 
and quickly overran South Sumatra. Early on March 
1st they landed on Java and within eight days the 
Dutch Commander-in-Chief, Lt. Gen. Ter Poorten, sur-
rendered in the name of all Allied forces in Java. 
Regardless of one's analysis of the circumstances 
of the Dutch defeat, it resulted in two clear con-
sequences. First, Dutch prestige in the eyes of the 
Indonesians suffered a devastating blow. Second, 
many Indonesians were convinced that, if given arms, 
they could have done as well as the Japanese. When 
the Japanese arrived, they were generally enthusias-
tically received. The popular feeling that they came 
as liberators was reinforced by their immediately al-
lowing the display of the red and white Indonesian 
national flag and the singing of Indonesia Raya, the 





George McTurnan Kahin, Nat:i:rn_U.~m and Revoly~ioIL.1.n 
Indonesia, p. 64. 
Ibid, p. 102. 
12 
1..Qig. p. 160. 
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Shortly after their arrival, the Japanese 
released Sukarno, the future President of Indonesia, 
from a Dutch jail in Benculen, and allowed him to 
proceed to his home island of Java. Sukarno worked 
openly with the Japanese while maintaining contact 
~1th an underground resistance organization. In 
November, 1943 Sukarno went to Tokyo to express the 
thanks of the people of Java for the measure of self-
government granted them by the Japanese. 
Another consequence of the Japanese occupation, 
extremely important in developing nationalist sentiments 
among Indonesians was the tremendous increase in national 
self-confidence of most educated Indonesians. This arose 
from the necessity of the Japanese to employ Indonesians 
in most of those administrative and technical positions 
f rom which they had removed Europeans. 13 
On August 17, 1945 the Indonesian nationalists 
drew up a declaration of independence. The Indonesian 
revolution had been launched and the popular response 
throughout the archipelago was tremendous. Four years 
of military action against Indonesian forces, the in-
tervention of the United Nations and pressure from the 
United States forced the Netherlands to transfer sov-
ereignty to Indonesia on December 27, 1949. 
13 
1.121,Q., p. 132 
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In the Indo-Chinese peninsula, the causes of 
. 14 
nationalism were found to be the following: 
1) The absorption of French attitudes of liberty, 
fraternity, and equality. 
2) The economic difficulties arising from scat-
tered land holdings, resulting in reduced 
production in agriculture. 
3) Reliance on foreign imports, especially for 
consumer goods and capital machineryA 
4) Exploitation of labor and natural resources 
by the French colonials . 
5) Unemployed "intellectuals, 11 cons ti tu ting a 
cadre of political rebels . 
The first manife s tation of a regional solidarity 
came with the early Japanese military victories. In 
November, 1943 the Assembly of Greater East Asia Nations 
was held in Tokyo . 15 The meeting was attended by delegates 
from the Philipines, Indonesia, Burma and Thailand, all of 
which were under full or semi-Japanese occupation. 
Towards the end of World War II the idea of a un-
ified Southeast Asia was propagated by the South East Asia 
command (SEAC) under the command of Lord Mountbatten. The 
command had its headquarters in Ceylon, and it seemed to 
make the phrase "Southeast Asia 11 assume military, geo-
graphic and political significance which heretofore the 
colonial powers had managed to avoid.
16 
14 8 Payne, .Q.Q, lli•, PP• · -9. 
1 5vanderbosch, Amry
1 
an~ Butwell, ~S~o~u~t~h_E=a=s~t---':";A=s=i7a....;;.;;A~m~0Mn~g 
:k[Qtl_d Powers ~Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1947), p. 248. 
16Ibid p. 248. 
17 
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It should be mentioned her e tha t the All-India 
Congr ess and the Koumintang Party had been the leading 
exponents of nationalism and r egionalism, although their 
efforts had been minor, conflicting , and irregular. A 
post war gathering of Asian countries was the meeting 
of the South East Asia League, whi ch was he ld i n Bangkok 
i n September, 1947. 17 
The Bangkok meeting was sponsored by the Communist 
Viet Minh, and from the outset had obvious leftist cha-
racteristics. The leadership was contributed by the ex-
Prime Minister of Thailand and the f amous Laotian Com-
munist Tran Van Luan. When Field Marshall Phibul Songram 
came into power in Thailand, the League was suppre ssed on 
the grounds that it was a communist front organization. 
Another form of regionalism was proposed by General 
Aung San of Burma, who suggested economic co-operation 
among the Asian countries which would be an added weapon 
i n the anti-colonial struggle. 18 With his assination, 
however, the idea died also and his successor U Nu did not 
carry the program through. 
Also in 1947 the Thailand Prime Minis ter, Nawasawa t 
proposed a Pan-South East Asian Union, with France and Thai-
l and to be the main sponsors. 19 It __ was to include France and 
Ibid. pp. 248-9. 
lSibid. pp. 249, 250. 
19I bid. p. 250. 
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Thailand , pl us Burma, Indone s ia , North Borneo and India. 
However, the idea received apathetic response among the 
o t her countries, mainly because France was a colonial 
power in the area. 
The first succ es sful conference was the Asian 
Re lations Confe rence held in New Delhi. This wa s mai nly 
under Indian sponsor ship and constituted the first post-
war effort toward unity and co-ordination of anti-colo-
20 nial drive. Nationalist China was cool toward s this 
idea . The result of the meeting was the establishment of 
a Secretariat (Non-governmental) to convene anothe r Asian 
Relations Conference. This never materialized. 
In 1949 a conference on Indonesia was held in New 
Delhi, under the sponsorship of the Indian government, for 
the purpose of agitating for Indonesian independence . 
In 1950, Australia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Thailand and Indonesia were participants in what 
was called the Baguio Conference. It wa s held und er Philip-
pine sponsor ship and was intended to set up an anti-Commu-
ni st alliance. The original purpose, however, was defeated 
by neutralist elements.21 
20 
.!J2j.g . p • 190 • 
21 
Ibid. p . 201. 
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In 1953 the first Asian Sociali st Conference was 
held in Rangoon. 22 The importance of this gathering was 
insignificant because it was ideological i n content and 
very few Asian Socialists parties were in control of t heir 
governments . 
In April, 1954, the l eaders of India, Burma, Pakistan, 
Indonesia and Ceylon met tog e ther specifica lly for talks about 
relations among themselves at the invitation of Sir John 
Kotealala. He called upon the countries of Southeast Asia to 
unite in a joint endeavor to become an effective force in the 
preservation of world peace, expressing the hope that the 
nations premiers would frequently come together f or consultation 
along the lines of the Commonwe alth premiers. Thus was the 
Colombo Conference born. 23 
22 
23 
Vandenbosch, Amry, and Butwell, QQ. cit. p. 257 
Wint 1 Guy. Wha t is the Col~mbo Plan? (London: The tiatchworth Press, 1952 , p. 13. 
CHAPTER II 
NEUTRALISM 
Another ideological force paralleling Asian 
nationali sm which influenced its r elationship with 
nations and other ideologies was the concept of neu-
tralism . Only Pakistan among the earlier mentioned 
Colombo powers did not openly and positively support 
the doctrine of neutralism. 
An und erstanding of the historical forc e s be-
hind neutralism is necessary to comprehend the sig-
nificance of the Bandung Conference . 
The term neutralism is being used by many 
lead ers who proclaim their independence from both blocs. 
Unlike the legal term of neutrality, neutralism is not 
a pre-determined position to be taken in case of emerg-
encies. It is a day to day method of dealing with the 
vexing question of East-West relationships. "It as-
serts that each state is determined to go its own in-
dependent way in accordance with its own current esti-
mate of its own interests; and it expresses the hope of 
getting along with both sides and doing business with 
both sides and perhaps influencing both sides and even 
of serving as a bridge to bring them closer together. 11 24 
24 
Robert Strausz-Hupe, American-Asian Tensions (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), p. 179. 
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The two main sourc es of neutra lism have been 
colonialism, which once covered almost all of Asia 
and Africa and the fear of atomic war. The newly in-
dependent countries know that if it were not for the 
World War II and the Japanese conquest of Southeast 
Asia, colonialism might still rule. They also know 
that since 1919 communists everywhere supported their 
fight for independence against Western colonialism. 
Since they have achieved their independence, the 
formerly colonial countries of Asia and Africa find them-
selves preoccupied with questions of industrialization 
and the raising of pitiful living standards. 
The importance of these countries to United States 
foreign policy should not be underestimated. The geo-
graphic and demographic position of India, Indonesia, 
and the United Arab Republic places them in a position 
to exert considerable moral pressure on Moscow and Peking. 
It also happens that it is the uncommitted nations 
of Asia , rather than the pro-American ones, which in gen-
eral have made the greatest progress toward political sta-
bility and decent standards of living.25 
Essentially, neutralism is a policy of "non-align-
ment" with either of the two power blocs, the Russian or 
the American, and at least theor.etically of equidistance 
politically from them. But it claims to be much more than 
25 
Strausz-Hupe, .QQ. cit., p. 196 
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mere isolationism. Its chief spokesman, Nehru, says it 
is a positive and active policy, not a negative one. 
Neutralism tries to mediate a nd prevent conflicts, not 
simply to stay out of them. 26 
In a press conference in June, 1956, President 
Dwight Eisenhower spoke with such understanding of the neu-
tralists position and of the military dangers to which "com-
mitted" countries were exposed, that stalwart members of 
NATO and SEATO were left puzzled and resentful. 27 A few 
days later Secretary of State John Foster Dulles left the 
"uncommitted" countries puzzled and resentful by stating 
that neutralism wa s obsolete, and "except in unusual cir-
cumstances, an immoral and shortsighted conception." Under 
questioning at a press conference later, 1r . Dulles indicat-
ed that, whatever might be said about neutralism, there were, 
in our harrassed world, no really "immoral" neutrals, al-
though countries which denounced collective security pacts, 
he felt were promoting a "somewhat wrong view of neutrality. 1128 
Here the Secretary of State evid enced no understanding of the 
position of India, for example, which does not connect the 
concept of neutrality with her foreign policy of neutralism. 
In Manila, meanwhile, Vice President Nixon was ex-




Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1957), p. 98. 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Neutrality: Varying Tunes," 
Foreign Affairs, October, 1956, p. 57. 
John Foster Dulles, Department of State Bulletin 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, July, 1956). 
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~ach nation to chart its own course, but "has no sympathy 
for that brand of neutralism which make s no moral dis-
tinction between communism and the free world1: 29 These 
varying references to neutralism serve to point out the 
difficulty in identifying this concept in dealing with 
specific situations. 
The proponents of neutralism feel that the re-
maining uncommitted countries must remain independent of 
either bloc, because as long as they are free to support 
or oppose they can tip the scales in favor of peace. Once 
they are committed they can no longer exert sufficient in-
fluence to avoid war. It was this influence that was 
brought to bear on Communist China and secured agreements 
regarding future relations with her neighbors in Asia. 
While Communist China might ve ry well transgress against 
South Korea or Formosa without violating her pledges at 
Bandung , she could no longer act freely in Laos, Burma, 
Siam or Cambodia. 30 
President Sukarno, in a speech before the Foreign 
Policy Association in New York on May 24, 1956, stated 
that the neutralist group did not advocate neutrality and 
did not attempt to withdraw from world conflicts. The 
neutralists, said Sukarno, have a part to play in the world 
2
the New York Times, August 17, 1956. 
30 
Formosa and North and South Korea were not invited to the 
Bandung Conference. 
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conflicts and will continue to act in the intere s ts of 
world peace . "In the sense tha t t he neutra lists have 
appeared late on the world stage, they have no long 
tradition of any particular foreign policy, no entang-
ling alliances, no historical enmities. Because of this, 
they may, through true statesmanship, be able to approach 
31 
each issue with an open mind and an independent viewpoint." 
Prime Minister Nehru has a lso be en conce.rned with 
the American reaction to neutralism. In a nationwide tel-
evised speech from Washington on December 18, 1956, he 
defend ed India's neutra lism and offered reassurances about 
India's loyalty to the cause of democracy. He declared 
that India's policy of"non-alignment in any military or 
similar pact or alliance" was a "positive and Dynamic ap-
proach" to the problems confronting his country_ In re-
porting on his speech, the New York Times frequently used 
neutralism, neutral and neutrality interchangeably to add 
to the confusion of this new policy.32 
In the Indian view, the contest for power be tween 
the United States and the Communist bloc appears as a major 
source of the tensions which have arisen between India and 
the United States during recent years. Practically all of 
the points on which India and the United States take issue, 
31 
u, s , News and World Reports, May 31, 1956. 
32 
The New York Times, December 19, 1956. 
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such as economic aid, color di scrimination, the use of 
f orce in international relations , and the whole complex 
of questions usually called colonialism, take on their 
add itional significance as far as the I nd i ans are con-
ce rned , because of the cold wa r . Indian l eaders are con-
vinced tha t to become embroiled in this bipolar struggle 
would be t antamount to losing everything that India has 
ga ined in her l ong strugg l e for na tiona l inde pend ence. 
Prime Minister Nehru has sa id often that there is 
no justification for s aying that there can be only two 
ideologi e s in the world ; one represented by Communist 
Rus sia a nd the other by some of the Jestern countries. 
" This i s too great a limitation of the power of thinking , 
or of action. Nehru says it is true that these ideologies are, 
i n a sense, dominating the world tod ay and are colliding with 
each other . This is partly because behind these two ideol-
og i e s there is enormous military and economic power. But it 
i s not the ideology that dominates; but the power behind 
the~: 33 
Whereas the United States and the Soviets feel that 
the East-We st comflict is the most important consideration 
in world affairs, the neutralist view is that colonialism 
in the economic sense , and the building up of the unde r -
deve loped countries constitutes the most important problem 
33 Tibor Mende, Neeru ( New York: George Braziller, Inc., 
1956), p. 7 • 
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facing the world today. 
The most striking difference between the views 
of the United States and those of India are regarding 
recognition of Red China. China looms large and im-
portant both in the Asian scene and in Indo-American 
relations. Shortly after the Communists came into power 
on the mainland., Prime Minister Nehru told a group of 
reporters in New York that the happenings in China are 
such that they cannot be ignored. 
Since 1949 India has tried to support China in 
her dealings with the West, and has been puzzled and dis-
turbed by the United States policy of refusing to recognize 
the Communist government and refusing to seat that regime 
in the United Nations . As far as New Delhi is concerned, 
it is mainly a question of Peking's being able to main-
tain effective control over nearly six hundred million 
Chinese and to rule the country with undisputed authority. 
One of the major goals in India's foreign relations 
during recent years has been to make China more acceptable to 
the world. Nehru and other spokesmen in ranking positions 
have often reiterated their contention that there can be 
no settlement of the problems of the Far East or of South-
east Asia unless the central fact of the existence of the 
People .' s Republic of China is accepted and acted upon by 
all the nations which are concerned with the stability of 
-23-
~4 t hat sector of the globe.~ In a speech delivered in the 
summer of 1954, Nehru went as far as to say that the 
exclusion of Red China from the United Nations was the 
r oot cause of all inter national trouble during the past 
f our years, that is, since the Korean War. 
The second obstacle from the Indian point of 
view is the United States policy of military pacts to con-
tain Communism. These pacts, starting with NATO, have 
been used time and time again, according to Nehru, not to 
contain Communism but to continue colonialism in Africa 
and Asia. 
India feels that our NATO allie s are using the arms 
we furnish them to continue their domination of Africa. The 
liquida tion of Western colonialism in Africa, its last ma j 0r 
stronghold, and the eradication of all its vestiges on the 
Asian continent are basic objectives of Indian foreign pol-
icy. It might even be more accurate to call them guiding 
principles, for India sees colonialism almost exclusively 
as an abstr act moral issue rather than as a mosaic of con-
crete political problems. 35 This distinction helps to ex-
plain why India, in her anticolonial policie s , has come into 
3 
Washington Star , July 12, 1954. 
35 
Mende, .QD.• cit., p. 34. 
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serious conflict with the United St a tes. India stands 
unalterably opposed to whatever "white" colonialism re-
mains, and is apparently unable to see the problem in 
t erms of what the West considers to be the realities 
of world politics . 
The United States, however, is unwilling to con-
cede to India a monopoly of the moral approach in inter-
national affairs. The United States will not accept the 
Indian belief in the good intentions of the Soviet Union 
and the People ' s Republic of China, nor does it wish to 
place its faith in mere moral suasion where the rights 
of the weaker peoples to chart their own future is at 
stake . 
Thus, since 1948 , the United States has made 
NATO the cornerstone of international relations in the 
West . India, on the other hand, demands that the West 
accept the emancipation of colonial areas as the prime 
and absolute moral imperative confronting the world at 
this historical junction. Emancipation , says India, should 
be immediately, notwithstanding the expansionist threats 
of the Soviet and Chinese communists . In making this de-
mand India does so without fully realizing that accept-
ance of such a demand would involve the disintergration of 
the We stern defense structure . 
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However, there is some recognition in India of 
the fact that the United States, while publicly takine 
its stand at the side of the colonial powers, has been 
quietly exerting pres sure on them to grant the right of 
self determination and self rule to the areas unaer their 
control. 
India, as well as some of the other neutralists 
states fe el that our policy of military aid and trying 
to build up military strength to oppose communism may 
bring on the war they want to avoid at all costs. They 
·have indicated that they had ra t her have freedom to make 
mistakes on their own ra t her than forfeit some of their 
fr eed om in exchange for military assistance. 
The psychological makeup of the leaders vary 
greatly within their own circle. Nehru, a Fabian Social-
ist from school days in England, is trying desperately 
to bring the Indian masses int o the modern world . His 
efforts to improve the economic position of India ' s 
people takes priority over everything . In order to im-
prove the economic position of India he must have peace. 
To avoid war Nehru would certainly wish aside any un-
pleasantness in international affairs, because for Nehru 
and India, the avoidance of conflict is a minimum require-
ment if the Indian people are ever to taste the fruits of 
the twentieth century. Nehru i s also politically wise. 
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He knows that his persona l powe r rests on his ability 
to walk the tight rope between the East and the West. The 
moment Nehru attaches himself to e i ther camp he becomes 
not a captain but a lieutenant among many. 
What is true of Nehru is also true of other neu-
tralists. Nas ser moved to power on the shoulders of the 
Egyptian army. Iraq and Egypt have long struggled for the 
rulership of the Arab World and for Nasser to remain passive 
is to insure his eventual collapse. Nasser, too, is aware 
that any alliance will only prevent the necessary flexabil-
ity he needs to unite the Arab peoples. 
Sukarno also faces similar problems. He is a Con-
stitutional President without actual power. He must con-
tinue to exercise political flip - flops to stay in power. 
In 1957 the Communist Party gained control of Java's main 
population centers at the expense of t he party Sukarno him-
self established. Sukarno's other political foes, who are 
largely anti-communist, also gained at the expense of Sukar-
no's own party . To abandon an independent policy at this 
time would certainly cause the fall of Sukarno and might 
well result in civil war. 
Another neutralist is President Tito of Yugoslavia. 
"Although Tito is a Communist, he has won his grea t est re-
nown by successfully f ighting Mosco"1 1 s attempt to doninate 
him and exploit his country. 11 36 
36 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong. op. cit. p. 60. 
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Another important state following neutralism 
is Indonesia. One word can be used to describe Indo-
nesian foreign and domestic policy--the word is Merdeka. 
Merdeka has connotations which make it a shorthand refer-
ence of independence, anticolonialism, neutra lism, nation-
a lism, in fact everything. Intense national pride causes 
the Indonesians to react violently to any presumed threat 
to Indonesian independence or to the nation ' s complete 
freedom of action. 
During the first few years after independence, 
Indonesian leaders frequently made reference to the United 
States in glowing terms . However, extreme nationalism dom-
inates Indonesian reactions to all political problems , and, 
as such , forms the root of Indonesian- American political 
relations . Thus Indonesians have indicated a strong sens-
itivity to any apparent attempt by the United States or 
any other nation to influence or to intercede in Indonesian 
affairs . Ma~y Indonesians also feel that NATO, SEATO and 
other defense alliances were organi zed to perpetuate colon-
ialism throughout Asia and Africa . This feeling was enforced 
by demonstrations by the Indonesian Communist Party and the 
Par t y Nationalist Indonesia . The Nationalist Party was 
founded by President Sukarno . 
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Indonesia's l ong exper i ence wi t h Western co-
lonia lism, her identification wi th the As ian-African 
a r ea and he r sympathy for othe r Moslem countries, in-
f l uences Indonesia' s f oreign policy. 
Although Indonesia r emains gr ea tly conce r ned 
with t he condition of North Africans and Arabs, the 
most importa nt colonial issue for Indone sia is the dis-
pute with the Dutch over Western New Guinea. New Guinea 
was part of the Dutch East Indie s and still is under 
Dutch control, although they evacuated the rest of Indo-
ne sia in 1950. The United Sta t e s has taken no part in 
the debate at the United Nations on this matte~ and the 
Indonesians have taken this to mean they support the Dutch . 
This abstention on an issue vita l to Indonesia has made 
understanding between the two countries difficult . 
Indonesia ' s foreign relations are based entirely 
on Indonesia's version of neutralism. All major politica l 
groups - from the right wing Moslems to the Communists a-
gree on this " independent foreign policy . " The principle 
of non-identifica tion with either the Soviet bloc or the 
We st ha s guided Indonesia's foreign policy since the ad-
vent of complete independence in 1949. 
The Indonesians invariably describe t heir policy 
as "independent" rather than neutral. The term neutralism 
is deliberately avoided in contexts which might be confused 
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with neutra lity. They f ee l that by carrying out an 
independ ent foreign policy, ther e will be more opportunity 
to provide mediation between t he conflicting powers and 
increase the power of Indonesia. 
The similarity between Indonesia ' s independ ent 
foreign policy and India' s neutra lism is apparent in the 
re f er ences to mediation, non-involvement, and the pro-
motion of peace so consistently found in Indonesian state-
me nts on foreign affairs. 
The leadership of the neutralists countries has, for 
the most part, been trained in Western Unive r si ties and 
has generally accepted Western t hinking. While this may 
seem to be an advantage to the Wes t it also has its draw-
backs. The fact that they led armies of patriots in the 
fight for liberation restricts the extent to which they 
can associate t hemselve s with We stern policies . 
"To sustain the dedication and the suffering of the 
rebellion ag ainst the colonial powers, the leaders of in-
dependence movements had to elaborate the distinction 
between themselves and their rulers which they derived from 
a claim to superior morality or at least superior spirit-
uality . When the battle was won the independence finally 
achieved, many leaders of newly independent countries have 
had to realize, at least subconsciously, that they were 
inwardly a good deal closer to their former rulers than 
to their own countrymen.37 
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Viewed from this angle, neutralism and anti-
colonialism are an absolute necessity from a domestic 
standpoint. The leaders may feel that by constantly re-
minding themselves and their followers that they are now 
independent will keep the masses under control until that 
far off day arrives when the promised economic fruits of 
independence will be realized. 
This explains why the most strident advocates 
of neutrality are often the very people who in dress, 
bearing, and manner of thinking are closest to the Wes t--
indeed, who often have spent very little of their lives in 
their own countries. 
The fact that nationalism was achieved over the 
ruins of Western Colonialism makes it much easier for 
the new leaders to gain support for foreign policies which 
continue the theme. 11 These conditions produce an almost 
irresistible temptation to defer the solution of difficult 
domestic problems by entering the international arena, to 
solidify a complicated domestic position by triumphs in the 
international field. 11 38 
CHAPTER III 
EVENTS LEADING TO THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE 
It has been in the international field that the 
leaders of the newly independent Asian nations have been 
most active. The meeting of the Colombo powers in Ceylon 
presented another opportunity for the leaders to gather 
informally and suggest the formation of a conference to 
include not only themselves but all of the independent 
nations of Asia and Africa . 
Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia 
said that the idea of regional cooperation among former 
colonial powers took shape at various social gatherings 
held in Washington, D. C. during the early 1950's. Dr. 
Ali, who was Indonesian Ambassador to the United States 
at the time, said that the ambassadors of several Arab 
and Asian nations gathered informally, usually at social 
gatherings in their homes and discussed t he desirability 
of increasing their contact with one another. 
Dr. Ali made an informal suggestion for a meet-
ing of Asian and African nations in a speech before the 
Council of World Affairs in New Delhi. Although Nehru 
was skeptical of any results the conference might achieve, 
he reluctantly agreed to the me e ting after Dr. Ali's speech 
was received with much acclaim in India's press. 
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Dr. Sastroami djojo' s suggestion was accepted in 
principle at the Co lombo me :2 ting and the Asian-African 
Conference was publicly proposed i n c e Colombo Powers'Joint 
communique of May 2, 1954. 39 
The purpose of the mee ting wa left undefined, but 
Indonesia 's Prime 1ini ster Sa s troamid jojo in discussing it 
said: "Asians will have to make dee s ·ons on their own fut-
ure, without interference by the \..J e ster n World. 11 40 
Nothing more was done a bout the conference until the 
fall of 1954. Then, Nehru, at thE. prodding of Sastroamidjojo 
who was then on a visit to ew De lhi , ·ssued a joint statement 
reaffirming the desirability of such a conference to further 
"peace" and a "common approa ch to pr ob~ems." 
This joint stateme nt was fol lo~ed a few we eks later 
by a similar joint stat~ment issued by Nehru and Burma's Prime 
Minister U Nu in Rangoon. The Prime Hinisters of all five Col-
ombo Powers met in Bogor, Ind one sia in December, 1954 and made 
a definite decision to hold the conference in Bandqng during 
the month of April, 1955. 
At the close of their mee ting i n Bogor, the Colombo 
Powers set forth the four general purposes of the conference 
as followst 
1. "To promote good wi l l an c operation 
among the nations of As ia and Afr ica , to ex-
plore and advance t heir mutual a s well as com-
mon interests, and to establi~h a d further 
39
Kahin , George, The_1\.jLian::.£hfLLG.fill-_S ... Q.n.t.:~ (Ithaca , 
New York: Cornell University 1~e ss, 1956) , p. 2. 
40 
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fri endliness and neighborly r elations;" 
2. "To consider problems of special int-
erest to Asian and African peoples, e.g., 
problems affecting nationa l sovereignty and 
of racialism and colonialism; 11 
3. "To conside r s ocial, economic and cul-
tural problems and relations of the countries 
repre sented;" 
4. "To view the position of Asia and Africa 
and their peoples in the world today and the 
contribution they can make to ~~e promotion of 
world peace and cooperation. 11 
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No specific agenda items for the Asian-African 
Conference were proposed at the December mee ting but 
some clues about the problems in the minds of the five 
conveners were provided by the subjects raised in their 
communique summarizing the discussion at Bogor. These 
included: Implementation of the Geneva conference de-
cisions on Indo-China, Indonesia's claim to West Irian, 
the independence movement in Tunisia and Morocco, nuclear 
and thermonuclear weapons, and the problems of economic 
cooperation and development. It was decided at Bogor that 
invitations would be sent to all sovereign and independent 
states in Asia and Africa, and that since many of those in-
vited did not have mutual diplomatic relations it should be 
specifically stated that attendance at this conference would 






It was also decided that participants would 
not be bound by any decisions mad e at the conference un-
less they voluntarily accepted them. 
The problems of even convening such a broad con-
ference were apparent from the start, and the criteria 
established for attendance were soon violated. To induce 
the Arab states to come, Israel had to be excluded. South 
Africa was not invited because of its racist policies, 
yet "nations" such as the Gold Coast and Sudan were in-
cluded even though they were not yet fully sovereign. 
Although no racial qualifications were mentioned, the 
three non-colored countries in Asia-Australia, New Zealand 
and the Soviet Union were not invited. 
The invitations revealed the many problems of the 
various members. North and South Vietnam were invited, 
partially because one of the purposes was to ease tension 
in the former colonies in Indo-China, but North and South 
Korea were not. Some of the nations were technically at 
at war with North Korea through the United Nations and 
others did not support Syngman Rhee of South Korea for 
various reasons. Communist China, which was formally recog-
nized by only the five Colombo powers and three others a-
mong those invited, was asked to come, but Nationalist 
China, which still maintained-diplomatic relations with 
many of the participants, was excluded. Japan was invited 
even though Indonesia, the host nation, was techni-
cally still at war with her. 
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Altoge ther , i nvi t t i ons wer e sent to 30 Asian 
and African countries, only one of which--the Central 
African Federation- declined to come . There was some 
hesitation on the par t of As i an Count ries closely al-
igned wi th the United State s , t o acce pt the invitation. 
However , Corlos Romulo, the Philippine Ambassador to 
Washington, fel t that the Uni t d t a t es should encourage 
the gathering. The United tate s n . i ther supported or 
attempted to influence the proce edings. 
Final reports listed t he fo l l owing nations in 
attendance: The African Sta t e s of Li beria, Ethiopia, 
Gold Coast, and Sudan; t he North frican and middle East-
ern states of Libra, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Syria, Iraq, I ran, and Turkey; India and Pakistan 
and the neighboring s tates of Ceylon, Nepal, and Afghan-
istan; the Southeast Asian sta ts of Burma, Indonesia, 
South and North Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Cambodia, 
Laos, and the only t"1o na t ions ,-i h i.ch have been world power s 
in a military sense, Japan a nd th e People's Republic of 
China. 
Few major confer ences have ever been held with so 
little clarification of aim s a s t he Bandung Conference. 
Apart from the general statem 0!nt of purposes drawn up at 
Bogor, no specific subj ec ts for dis cussion were listed. 
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It was decided, in fact, not to try to formulate an 
ag enda until all the invitees gathered at Bandung. 
As a result, in the two and one-half months pre-
ceding the conference the field was left wide open for 
specula tion about what the conference would consider. 
Much of the speculation was based upon guesses about 
the motives and purposes of India's Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Communist China's Prime Minister 
Chou En-lai. 
There were some indications that aims of the 
Colombo powers might coincide to a considerable degree. 
Nehru, although firmly anti-communist in India, had 
taken a clear stand against alignment with either the 
Western or Soviet bloc in international affairs. He had 
severly criticised military alliances such as the Manila 
( SEATO) Pact sponsored by the United States . Nehru had 
advocated peaceful coexistence with the Communist states 
and had done everything possible to establish friendly 
relations with Peking. 
Chou En-lai, had also, for his own reasons, at-
tacked Wes tern oriented military pacts and alliances and 
followed a line of supporting the idea of peaceful co-
existence . Since the Geneva Conference, that stopped the 
fighting in Indo-China and established the division of 
Vietnam, Communist China's foreign policy towards South-
east Asian countries had clearly been one of tolerating 
and encouraging neutralism in that area. 
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In 1954 Chou En-lai had signed agreements with both 
India and Burma supporting the "Five principles of co-
existence .1142 
George~. Kahin, of Cornell University, listed 
three important objectives of the Colombo powers in call-
ing for an Asian-African Conference . Dr . Kahin stated 
that the avoidance of war between the United States and 
Communist China was a very important consideration. In 
late 1954 and early 1955 the area around Quemoy and Matsu 
off the East coast of China had been the scene of heavy 
fighting between the forces of Communist China and the 
Nationalis ts group which had fled five years earlier 
to Formosa . The United States had indicated that it might 
go to the aid of the Nationalists government in the event 
of an invasion of the islands by the Red Chinese . 
Another objective of the conference was to en-
courage the diplomatic independence of the People's Repub-
lic of China. The third objective was the containment of 
------ ----
42These principles were first announced in the preamble to 
the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet concluded on April 
29 1954 in Peking. They were r~iterated in talks 
between Chou En-lai and Nehru in June, 1954, in New 
Delhi: Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, non-aggression, non-~nterference in each 
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit 





Chinese and Vi e t minh mi litary and politi cal powe r at the 
Southe r n bord er of China. The combatting of illegal and 
subversive Communist activities in their own countrie s was 
becoming a problem. 43 
India and Burma envi saged as a major objective of 
the Bandung Conference the application of a formula, first 
-wo r ked out by Nehru a year before , calculated to encourage 
China to fo l low a peaceful course. Though Nehru was in 
general convinced that China was honestly disposed to fol-
low such a course , there r emained in his mind some margin 
of doubt. These doubts were acknowledged by him in an 
unpublished circular letter written to his own Congress 
Party just after Chou En-lai ' s visit to New Delhi in 
J une , 1954. 
Nehru later developed the thesis of Red China's 
-w illingness to abide by the Five Principles of coexistence 
mi ght be increased if "an environment" could be created 
-which -would make it difficult or at least awkward for her 
t o flout these principles. This environment could be cre-
ated by Red China's r e iterated public pledge of adherence 
t o the principles against a background of a watchful Asian 
public opinion. 
Such an environment could constitute a significant 
mor a l restraint against any diviation from these principle s. 
43 -ahin, op . cit ., P• 4-5. 
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The more frequent Red China's pled ge to observe these 
principles, and t he widerthe audience, the more sub-
stantial would be the environment - and t he clearer the 
r es training force. The Asian-Afr ican Confer ence was seen 
a s providing maximum conditions for the building up of 
this environment. 
The Indians, Burmese, and Indonesians, from ex-
perience in their own nationalist movements were con-
vinced that China's nationalism was a force of such 
strength as to ensure that she will not align her for-
eign policy with that of the Soviet Union unless this 
is seen to be clearl y in her own national interest. Thus ' 
they believed that if China were given wider cont acts and 
a broad er range of diplomatic maneuver, she would t end to 
move away some dis t ance f r om the Soviet or bit . It was 
their opinion that to the extent that this distance in-
crea ses the tendency towards world politico-mili tary polar-
iza tion would be deminished. 
Nehru believed that China was probably devoted to 
a policy of peace for several years to come and would not 
undertake agressive action unless persuaded that the United 
St a tes was preparing for hostile action against her. 
Moreover, it had long been the view of all five 
Colombo powers that one factor conducive to a warlike at-
titud e on China's part was her leati-e~s • lack of contact 
With the outside world . They believed the Chinese had 
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developed a distorted impr ession of the outlook of the 
non-communist governments of Asia towards the We st. They 
also believed that China underrated t heir dislike of China's 
close relationship with the Sovie t Union. 
The Colombo leaders felt that if the Chinese estab-
lished further contacts with As ian leaders and came to 
understand their outlooks in international affairs they 
would be less inclined to undertake policies which would 
cause a world war . 
Thus the governments of the five sponsoring coun-
tries felt that the As i an-African Conference could pro-
vide an opportunity f or China to increase her diplomatic 
independence of Sovie t Russia . 44 
4l+or . Ali Sastroami djojo, December 181 1958, Indones ian Consulate , New York City . Dr . Ali and the author 
spent t hr ee hours discussing the Bandung Conference 
a nd the r ol e of t he neutral i s ts a t the Conference . 
Much of the materia l selec ted for t his pap er wa s 
discussed a t length with t he Confe r ence chairman. 
The s tatements regarding the Peop le 's Republ ic of 
China made by t he aut hor were discussed wi t h t he 
f ormer Indones i an Prime 1inister. 
CHAPTER IV 
BANDUNG CONFERENCE 
The problem of providing for an agenda for the 
Asian-African Conference was left undecided by the host 
countries and the invitations stipulated that the invited 
nations themselves would decide what should be taken up 
at the meeting. The day before the Conference was sched-
uled to begin Prime Minister Nehru contacted the twenty 
two delegations that had arrived and, to save time during 
the regular conference, decided to adopt rules governing 
the order of business, procedure arrl agenda. 
Nehru had been skeptical from the beginning about 
the ability of the nations to accomplish anything substan-
tial at the Conference and, in an effort to minimize the 
danger of division, attempted to cancel the pre-arranged 
schedule that had allot·ted twenty minutes to the head of 
each delegation to present his greetings and introduce idea s 
and suggestions. If this procedure was to be followed the 
opening speeches alone would take two full days. Nehru 
was also of the opinion,though he did not express this to 
most delegates, that elimination of these speeches might 
forestall introduction of particular controversial problems 
and partisan sentiments which might deal an early blow to 
hopes for the conference's uni~Y and harmony. Again the 
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twenty-one assembled delegations agreed to accept India's 
stand, but in this case the agreement of many was grudg-
ing.45 Pakistan's delegation was headed by Mohammed Ali, 
who arrived in Djakarta shortly before the meeting was over 
and refused to accept the decisions . Pakistan was parti -
cularly dismayed because she was one of the sponsoring 
nations. Many other delegations that arrived the next day, 
April 18 , also sided with Pakistan. The decisions were later 
reversed and each delegation was allowed , as previously agreed 
on , to address the Conference. 
The drama surrounding the opening session took on 
added meaning with the arrival of Chou t n-lai . Several 
days earlier an Indian airliner , The Kashmir Princess , had 
crashed, killing several members of the Red Chinese delega-
tion. On the morning of pril 18th, thousands of Indo-
Chinese citizens lined Djalan Afro-~sian, Bandung's main 
avenue , to cheer the Chinese Premier . The Indonesians 
gave their fellow Hoslem--Gamel Abdel Nasser a tremendous 
welcome also . 
resident Sukarno of Indonesia gave the welcoming 
address and set the tone of the meeting: 
Sukarno quickly made reference to the unique makeup 
of the Confer ence . "This is the first intercontinental con-
ference of coloured peoples in the history of mankind ! It 
is a new depar t ure in the history of the world that leaders 
of Asian and African peoples can mee t together in their own 
45?resident Sukarno, E.e.n.ort on Indqpe$ia, Indones ian Embassy, 
ashington , D. c., June, 1955. 
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countries to discuss and deliberate upon matters of 
common concern •••• for many generations our peoples 
have been the voiceless ones in the world. We have been 
the un-regarded, the peoples for whom decisions were made 
by others whose interests were paramount, the peoples who liv-
ed in poverty and humiliation. 046 
Sukarno introduced the colonial issue by refer-
ence to an analysis of colonialism he had made earlier • 
It 
• • • then I drew attention to what I called the 'Life-
line of imperialism.' This line runs from the Straits 
of Gibralter, through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, 
the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, The South China Sea and the 
Sea of .Japan. 047 One of the audience, Premier Nasser of 
Egypt,eliminated the Suez Canal from Sukarno's list fif-
teen months later. 
The changed map of Asia was acknowledged. "The 
passive peoples have gone, the outward tranquillity has 
made place for struggle and activity. Irresistible force s 
have swept the two continents." 
A second major issue was introduced when Sukarno 
made mention of the fear of impending atomic conflict."Yes, 
we are living in a world of fear. The life of man today is 
corroded and made bitt er by fear. Fear of the future, fear 
of the hydrogen bomb, fear of ideologies." The conference 
went on recor d in its final communi u1~ as giving; "anxious 
thought to the question of wo r l d peac e and cooperation. I t 
viewed with deep concern t he pr sen t state of international 
tension with its dange r of an atomic vorld war." 
The Pre s id ent wa s also co gni zant of the many differ-
ences which separated t he de l egates. He said however: uwe 
are united, for instance, by a common destation of colonial -
ism in whatever form it appear s . ~✓ e are united by a com-
mon destation of r acialism. And we are united by a common 
determination to preserve and s t a bilise peace in the world." 
The noted speaker again mad e r efe r ence to colonialism when 
he warned the delegates not to think of colonialism only i n 
the classic sense. " Co l onia l i sm ha s also its modern dress, 
in the form of economic contro l , int llectual control, and 
actual physical cont ro l by a sma l l but alien community with-
in a nation." The intensity of f eeling on this subject is 
underlined by the thir t een times Sukarno made reference to 
col onialism during this opening addr - ss. 
He made reference t o Ameri ca's role as t he first 
nation to successfully over t hrow a colonial government. "'the 
battle against colonia lism ha s been a long one, and do you 
know that today is a famous anniversary in that battle? On 
the eighteenth day of April , one thousand seven hundred and 
seventy five, just one hundred and e ighty years ago, Paul 
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Revere rode at midnight through the New England country-
side, warning of the approach of British troops and of 
the opening of the American War of Independence, the first 
successful a nti-colonial war in history. 11 
At this point the Indonesian president returned 
again to the prospects of an atomic war. 11 Not so long 
ago it was possible to take some little comfort from the 
idea that the clash, if it came perhaps could be settled 
by what were called "conventional weapons" - bombs, tanks, 
cannons and men. Today that little grain of comfort is 
denied us, for it has been made clear that the weapons of 
ultimate horror will certainly be used, and the military 
planning of nations is on that basis. 11 "• •• What can 
we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason 
into world affairs. We can mobilize all the spiritual, all 
the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on 
the side of peace." 
The next speaker was Prime Minis t er Ali Sastroamid-
jojo of Indonesia and newly elected President of the Asian-
African Conference. Much of the credit for convening the 
conference goes to Dr. Ali. He first introduced the idea 
to the Colombo members while he was Foreign Minister . of 
Indonesia. Later, when he was chosen Prime Minister, he 






Pr ime Minister Sastroamidjojo said that the foremost 
reason which gave birth to the Conference was the ago-
nizing t ensions from which the world was suffering. He 
a sked: "Where do we, the people of Asia and Africa, stand 
and for what do we stand in the world dominated by fear; 
the fe a r that on any one day another war may be unleashed 
upon mankind, bringing horrors of distruction never dreamed 
of before?" Both Sukarno and Sastroamidjojo were concerned 
over remarks made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
before the Council on Foreign Affairs in New York a year 
earlier. It was before this body that Secretary Dulles 
48 announced his massive retaliation policy . 
Sastroamidjojo reiterated the anti-colonial theme 
and charged that colonialism was among the main causes of 
present day tensions. "It may be true that the larger part 
of mankind accepts the obvious truth that colonialism is 
to be considered as a thing of the past, but the fact re-
mai ns t hat colonialism is still very much alive." 
"Next to colonialism, we meet racialism as an im-
portant source of tension. Racialism, in fact, is often-
if not always- an aspect of colonialism, based on feelings 
48 
John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Poreign Policy,rr 
Department Qf State Bulletin, Vol. xxx, No. 761, 
(Washington, D. c., January 25, 1954.) 
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of superiority by the dominating group." 
"Another and very serious source of tension is the 
low standard of living in practically all the Asian and 
African countries. For centuries our countries poured 
a never-ending stream of profits into the dominating coun-
tries, while we ourselves stayed poor and underdeveloped. 
In the aftermath of Wor ld War II, we won our independence, 
but our political freedom could not yet bring us economic 
independence nor erase the backwardness and underdevelop-
ment from which our people have suffered so long." 
Sastroamidjojo pointed with pride to his handiwork. 
"The world is following this conference with great interest 
" and high hopes •• ~ .If we are able to express our desire 
and determination for peace in unmistakable terms, if our 
laborers will have some salutary influence on the way of 
thinking of mankind, if we can contribute to eliminating 
fear and want, so eagerly hoped for by all, then the Confer-
ence will have fulfilled its historic task."
49 
Despite pride in his efforts at convening the Con-
ference, Dr. Ali was justifiably disappointed in the recep-
tion given it by the United States . The Soviet President, 
Voroshelov sent cabled $reetings before arxl after the Con-
ference. The United states Department of State remained 
cool throughout, although, DuJ,l_es later conceded that the 
49""------
&..Port On Indrmesia, .212• sil• 
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Conference did contr ibute toward s easing world t ensions .50 
Car los P. Romulo , Philippine Ambassador to the United 
States , represented his country a t Bandung . He intr o-
duced a note of rea l ism i n an other wise r omantic setting . 
Romul o sa id: nTher e ar e a t least three t hing s more to be 
said here a bout t hi s ma tter of national political fre edom." 5l 
"Fir s t i t i s perilously easy i n t his world f or na t i-
ona l independence to be more fiction than fact. Because 
it expr esses the deepest desires of so many people in the 
wor l d, it can be unscrupulously us ed a s a shibboleth, as 
a f a cade , a s an instrument for a new and different kind of 
s ubjecti on ••••• I wonder if in such countries you could r ead 
in the press or hear in the public speeche s of their spokes-
men anything resembling the open criticism and other at-
tacks that were common fare in places like India and the 
Philippines even before independence. I wonder if any of the 
spokesmen of these countries would ever speak as freely i n 
c ritic i sm of the bigger country to which they feel friendly 
or a lli ed as, say, we in the Philippines speak our minds 
a bout the United States •••• ! think we ought to say plainly 
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direct assault on the communist definition of freedom and 
independence was well understood by the delegates, a maj-
ority of which were educated in the Wes tern-liberal tra-
dition. 
Romulo then directed his remarks to thos e countries 
who achieved political independence without corresponding 
increases in freedom for their people. "Secondly, is 
political freedom achieved when the national banner rises 
over the seat of government, the foreign ruler goes, and 
the power passes into the hands of our own leaders? Is 
the struggle for national independence the struggle to sub-
stitute a loca l oligarchy for the foreign oligarchy? •••• Is 
political freedom where only one political party may rule? 
•••• It strikes me that autocratic rule, control of the press, 
and the police state are exactly the worst features of some 
colonialist systems against which we have fought all our 
lives and against which so many of us are still fighting." 
The third item that Romulo chose for discussion was 
one which Nehru and Chou En-lai had attacked vigorously in 
many public speeches. Romulo defended the need of the small-
er nations to enter into defensive arrangements with larger 
friendly powers to protect their newly won independence. 
''Finally, in this world of contending great powers, the in-
d ependence of the small or weak nation is at best a 
- 50-
precar ious and fragile thing. Obviously, the ultimate 
greate r fre ed om will lie in a greater coherence, a unit-
ing of regiona l and physical strength, in the greatest 
p os sible common action by all to avert the disaster of a 
ne-w world war." 53 
Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, of the Republic 
o f Egypt also spoke on the opening day. Prime Minister 
Nasser echoed the call of the two previous speakees in 
expre ssing concern over the growing danger of atomic war. 
" All over the world there is a growing sense of insecurity. 
The fea r of war has been aggravated by the development of 
mass-destructive weapons capable of effecting total anni-
hilation. The stakes are high in terms of the survival of 
mankind • "53 
t he ~gyptian leader also brought up the necessity 
for ending colonia lism as a requi rement for easing inter-
na t i onal tension. "LasL, bu-c noc leas t , i s the l1.qu1.dat- 1.on 
of coion1.al1.sm whi ch has always been a source of fric t ion 
and unrest. Since the days of colonial expans ion, t he prob-
l e m of colonial rule by alien powers ha s la in at the roots 
of many wars . We have been witnessing for some years the 
ri s ing tide of nationalism not only in our part of the 
world but also in various parts of Asia and Africa. Our 
own experience shows us that nationali sm when thwarted 
crea t e s difficult problems;. but if it isdealtwith wisely 
53 
Kahin, Qll. tlt• p. 10 
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and realistically, it responds with friendship and generosity • 
. . • I hardly need to emphasize that we live now in a diffi-
cult age and that the people have awakened and nothing can 
stem the tide of nationalism and progress." 
On its third day the Conference went into ~he first 
of a long s eries of closed sessions devoted to discussions 
of substantive matters, and the ~olitical Committee became 
the principal center of activity.54 
During the meeting Chou ~n-lai pledged China's 
support of the Arab dispute with alestine and in doing so 
linked the situation in the 11 iddle East with his own problem 
with Taiwan. The strongly worded statement was not approved 
by the committee, however. Next the committee passed a 
resolution in favor of ndonesia' s stand on Jest lrian. 'l'be 
Egyptian resolution on French ~orth Afrida was accepted in 
the following manner: "ln view of the unsettled situa tion 
in 'fo rth Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples 
of North Africa their right ~o self-determination, the sian-
African Conference declares its support of the rights of the 
p eoples of Algeria, 1•1orocco, and Tunisia to self-deter-
mina tion and independence, and urges the Fr ench Government 
to bring about a peaceful set t lement of this issue without 
delay. 11 55 
54 h ' · t 10 ~a in, op. c1 ., p. • 
55Final Communique of Asian-African Conference, eport Un 
lndonesia, 
-52-
The most explosive issue of the Conference was 
introduced by ir John ,otelawala of Ceylon. Kotelawala 
told the members that: 11 '1'here is another form of colonial-
ism, however, about which many of us represented here are 
perhaps less clear in our minds and to which some of us 
would perhaps not agree to apply the ter m colonialism at 
all. Think , for example, of those satellite states unde r 
Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe--of 
Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and ~oland. Are not these colonies as much as 
any of the colonial territories in Africa or Asia 'r And if 
we are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it 
not be our duty to openly declare our opposition to Soviet 
colonialism as much as to estern imperialism't 11 56 
Kotelawala continued: "Indonesia took the strongest 
posi tion on the North African question. Her delegate, Foreign 
11inister Sunario, asked that ther~ be established a Committee 
of Good Offices which would have the function of closely fol-
lowing developments in Jorth Africa and taking whatever 
measures it deemed proper to mediate between the French govern-
ment and the people of forth Africa in order to lessen 
tension. 11 57 
The remarks of the Ceylonese delegate almost 
disrupted the romantic illusion of solidarity the Conference 
had tried so hard to attain. Chou n-lai , fearing that 
Chine se policy would be dragged i nto the discuss ion, 
56sir John hotelawala, New York r imes, April, 1955. 
57 Kahin, op. cit., p. 18. 
-53-
announced tha t he would i ns J. s "t on delivering an ora l spee ch 
in de f ense . However, these remarks were made in a hearing 
c losed to the public and the Ceylonese Prime Minister did 
not of f e r his remarks to the general Conference in the form 
of a resolut ion. 
Mohammed li of Pakistan stated that it was "un-
realistic to condemn French colonialism while ignoring that 
o f Soviet Russia, an imperialistic nation with satellites 
which had brought many people under its heel.n China wa s 
not included in these remarks. "The distinguished delegate 
of China should not misunderstand the purppse ••• China i s 
ce r tainly not imperialistic • 11 58 
The discussion continued and the representative 
from Iran mentioned Iran's relations with Soviet Russia in 
1946 when the Soviets withdrew from Irianian territory 
after strong intervention from the U. s. He mentioned the 
d anger of subjugation, infiltration and subversion from 
Soviet agents within his own country. 
"Nehru, gravely concerned over the disharmonious 
and disruptive drift of debate, then attempted to salvage 
the situation by classifying the countries of Eastern 
Europe as non-colonial and outside the field of the Con-
f erence's consideration. They were, he argued, recognized 
as sovereign and independent by the United Nations, and if 
the Conference chose to relegate them to the status of 
58Mohammed Ali , Times of Indonesia, Djakarta, April 19, 1955. 
c olonies i t was challenging t he Uni ted Nations' bas i s of 
r ecognition." 59 
The cl osed session a lso brought fo r th a charge by 
Burma ' s U. Nu t hat the United Nations "had more than one 
yardstick for measuring aggr ession." He was refer r ing t o a 
number of ex- Koumintang so ld i ers who fled into Northern Burma 
afte r the fall of China to the Communists . Burma has been 
t r ying t o push them back into China or have them evacuated 
to Formosa since early 1950. 
Cambodian Prince Norodom said that most of the 
sta te s mistrusted the Communis ts and that the validity of 
c o-existence was up to the Communists. 
At this point the delegates of Turkey and Pakistan 
d efended their right to join defensive pacts with the West. 
11 Turkey' s delegate strongly supported Pakistan's principle 
of coll ective self-defense, arguing that to co-exist a 
count ry must be prepared to defend itself; for small coun-
tri es this meant collective defense arrangements, without 
whi ch Turkey would have lost her independence. 11 60 
Nehru had gone on record many times earlier agains t 
any military pacts whatever and he singled out NATO for abuse. 
The Indian leader then went into an attack on NATO 
and a ccused it of being a protector of co l oni alism. He 
charged: II • • • do the Honorable members of this assembly 
59Kahin , op. cit., p. 21 
60 Kahin, op, cit., p. 23. 
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realize that the NATO today is one of the most powerful pro-
tectors of colonialism~ I say tha t explicitly. I am not 
saying that indirectly, but directly and explicitly ••.• 
v e ge t letters from the NATO powers t elling us ' You should 
not do anything in r egard to Goa , you should not do this or 
that. 11161 Goa i s a colony of i-iortugal, a NATO member, on 
the southwe stern coast of I ndia. 
Nehru's position on military pacts was well-known 
before his speech to the political committee. 
However, when the North · oreans crossed the 38th 
~arallel in J une, 1950, India ~as among the first to join 
with the democratic countrie s in denouncing it as aggression, 
and promptly sent an lndian Army hospital unit to South Korea. 
Nehru explained later that "Any military assistance is 
beyond India's capacity and would make little difference." 
At the same time he declared that it was "perfectly clear" 
that North Korea launched a full - scale and well-planned 
invasion. Later, in carrying out the armistice terms in 
r'-orea, I ndia contributed five thousand troops who supervised 
the repatriation of the prisoners . 62 
Although quick to accuse North Korea of aggres-
sion, India refrained from naming China as the aggressor 
after the Chinese Army had crossed the Yalu River to engage 
U. s . troops. But in China ' s eyes, as Peking had warned 
New Delhi, MacArthur's advanc e on the Yalu, not the Chinese 
6 1 ehru, Mimeographed release by Indian Information Service, 
Bandung , April 22 , 1955. 




reaction to it, was an act of aggression. These proposals 
and actions hardly accord with neutralism as the world 
understands it. India's foreign policy therefore, as Nehru 
has often insisted, is independent and not neutrai.63 
Nehru then asked the political committee to consider 
the steps that might be taken by the Bandung powers. He 
suggested that the first step should be to make their views 
clear. He said that India would never take part in a war 
unless it was necessary to defend the sub-continent itself. 
He said: "If I join any of these big groups I lose my 
identity; I have no identity left, I have no view left •••• 
If all the world were to be divided up between these two 
big blocs what would be the result? The inevitable result 
would be war. Therefore, every step that takes place in 
reducing that area in the world which may be called the 
unaligned areas is dangerous and a step that leads to 
war. 1164 Nehru then stated his position on the security 
pacts. He said that every pact--meaning NATO, SEATO, 
arsaw--has brought on insecurity and not security to the 
countries which have entered into them. 
Chou En-lai submitted to the will of Nehru and 
was prepared to forgo speaking and hand out a written text 
in order to save time. However , he later delivered a 
second speech in reply to the addresses of several of the 
63Frank Moraes , Jawaharlal Neer~, The MacMillan Company, 
New York-1947, pp. 441- 5. 
64Nehru, Indian Information Service, op, cit. 
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d elegates. " Apparently for Chou En-lai the addresses of 
several of the delegates were a matter of serious concern. 
He did not discard his mimeographed speech; it remained offi-
c ial, but he requested leave to supplement it with an oral 
address which he likewise designated as official. In this 
unscheduled off-the-cuff addendum Chou appeared to be deeply 
concerned both over the anxieties of Cambodia and Thailand 
regarding Chinese policy and over the strongly anti-Communist 
tone exhibited by so many of the delegates. u65 
In the mimeographed speech passed out to the 
delegates in lieu of a formal address, Chou ~n-lai seconded 
many of the statements already presented by earlier speakers . 
He also saw great significance in the conference because~ 
11 ~t 1s the first time in history that so many countrie s of 
Asia and Africa have gathered together to hold a conference. 
On these two continents live inore than half of the world 
population. 1166 
The Premier of 600 million Chinese also made the 
expected attack on colonialism: "Ever since modern times 
most of the countries of Asia and Africa in varying degrees 
have been subjected to the plunder and oppression of colonial-
ism, and have thus been forced to remain in a stagnant state 
of poverty and backwardness. Our vo:1.ces have been surpressed, 
our aspirations shattered, and our destiny placed in the 
hands of others." 
6 5Yahin, QQ, cit ., P • 11+. 
66chou En-lai , Vital Speeches, op. cit., p. 1275. 
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Chou then made reference to the changes that 
n ationalism and the erosion of British, French and Dutch power 
ma de in Asia and Africa: " Now the face of the Asian-African 
reg ion has undergone a radical change. Mo re and more coun-
t ries have cas t off or are casting off the shackles of colon-
ialism. The colonial powers can no longer use methods of 
the past to continue their plunder and oppression. The Asia 
and Africa of today are no longer the Asia and Africa of 
y esterday. 11 
The expected attack on the United States came in 
reference to support of the Na tionalists on Taiwan and the 
u. s . policy of overseas military ba ses. The communist 
theme of experimenting with the atomic bomb with Asian lives 
1Nas also introduced. 11 The United States continues to crea te 
tension in the Taiwan area. Countries outside of Asia and 
Africa are establishing more and mo!e military bases in the 
Asian and African countries. They are clamoring openly that 
a tomic weapons are convential arms and are making preparations 
f or an atomic war. The people of Asia shall never forget tha t 
the first atomic bomb exploded on Asian soil and that the 
f irst man to die from experimental explosion of a hydrogen 
bomb was an Asian. 67 
The theme which many of the delegates presented 
concerning the ban of atomic weapons and a general reduction 
67chou was making reference to the Japanese fisherman who 
died as a result of radioactive fall-out from an American 
Hydrogen Bomb test at Bikini. 
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in armaments was also mentioned by Chou En-lai: "The peace 
movement of the people in different countries has become 
more extensive and intensive. They demand that first of all 
the big powers should reach agreement on the reduction of 
armaments. They demand the prohibition of atomic weapons 
and all other weapons of mass destruction. They demand that 
atomic energy be used for peaceful purposes in order to bring 
welfare to mandkind •••• Like other countries in Asia and 
Africa we (China) are in urgent need of a peaceful inter-
national environment for the development of our independent 
and sovereign economy. 1168 
The most "politically" important portion of Chou's 
mimeographed presentation went almost unnoticed at the time. 
This was his reference to the Suez Canal: "The struggle of 
the Egyptian people for the restoration of their sovereignty 
over the Suez Canal Zone, the struggle of the Iranian people 
for the restoration of sovereignty over their petroleum 
resources, and the demand for the restoration of territorial 
rights of India over Goa and of Indonesia over West Irian 
(We st New Guinea), have all won sympathy from many countries 
in Asia and Africa." The immediate result of the Bandung 
Conference as far as Red China was concerned was diplomatic 
recognition from Egypt. The result as far as Egypt was con-
cerned was perhaps a psychological boost for Nasser and 
68c hou, Vital Speeches, .QJ2..s....£1.t., p. 1276. 
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diploma tic support from the Asian and African nations f or his 
s ubse quent nationaliza tion of the Suez Canal Zone fifteen 
months later. The climate crea t ed by t he As i an-Afric an Con-
fe r ence s t imulated and gave popular support to those nationa-
li s t s who heretof ore l acked international stature to comple t e 
the ir pr ograms. 
The suppl ementary speech wa s delivered orall y by 
Chou En-la i on the second day of the Conference. 69 The 
spee ch quoted earlier was handed to the delegates afte r he 
delivered his supplementary address in response to criticisms 
he f elt other delegates had directed against China. 
" The Chinese delegation has come here to seek 
common ground, not to create divergence, 11 said Chou. "Now 
first of all I would like to talk about the question of 
different ideologies and social systems. e have to admit 
that among our Asian and African countries we do have diff-
erent ideologies and different social systems. But this 
does not prevent us from seeking common ground and being 
united." The common ground Chou sough t was the "Five 
rincipl es of Co-existence" agreed on earlier be tween Nehru 
and Chou En-lai and later by U Nu of Burma and Chou En-lai. 
The question of the lack of religious belief on 
the part of communist nations interjected in the Confer ence 
69chou-Enlai , Asian-African Confere~, Bandung, I ndone sia, 
18th--24th April , 1955~ Speeches and Communiques , 
Jakarta: Ministry of Information , Republic of 
Indonesia, May, 1955. 
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an anti-communist note that Chou felt he must answer. 
"Fr eedom of religious beli ef is a principle recognized by all 
modern nations . We Communists are atheists , but we respect 
all those who have r eligious belief. We hope that those 
with religious belief will also respec t those without." Chou 
went on to say that China had seven million communists and 
tens of millions of 1oslems and Buddhists, Protestants and 
Ca tholics and called for the community of Asian and African 
c ountries to unite those with religious belief and those 
without. 
Chou then turned directly to the problems raised by 
Cambodia and Thailand regarding dual nationality of Chinese 
l iving within their country. Prince Wan Wa ithayakon of 
Thailand had charged that Thailand fac ed the threat 11 of 
i nfiltration and subversion, if not direct aggression, 11 
from a Thai politician organizing Thai-speaking Chinese in 
Yunnan province. Prince Wan also attacked the old Chinese 
cus t om of regarding all Chinese regardless of bir th, desire, 
o r domicile as citizens of China: 11 ! also know for certain 
t he attitude adopted by the People's Republic of China in 
regard to the so-called persons of dual nationality in 
Thailand or, in other words, to the Chinese community of 
3 ,000 ,000 in Thailand out of a population of 18,000,000. 11 
This problem of large alien populations living 
within national boundries caused considerable trouble in 
almost all the countries of Asia. Burma, Malaya, Singapore, 




Philippines contai n large numbers of Chi nese citizens who 
remain unassimi l ated after gene r a t i ons of living outs ide 
China . This was clear ly an issue which could not be explai ned 
away as anti-coloni ali sm or anti-communi sm. It wa s anti -
Chinese , and unti l China , r ega rd le s s of her i nternal political 
control , could a s s ist in solvi ng thi s problem she would find 
it dif ficult to become accepta ble to her As ian ne i ghbors . 
In t hi s context, Chou said the problem of dual 
na t ionality was "something l eft behind by old China ••• • 
up to da te Chi ang ai-shek is still using some very f ew 
ove rseas Chinese to carry out subversive activi ties against 
t he countrie s where they are residing. The people's govern-
ment of new China, however, is ready to solve the problem 
of dual nationality with the government of the countries 
concerned." 
11 eking's willingness to carry out this promi se 
was attested t o later during the course of the Conference 
by Chou' s negoti ation of a treaty with Indone s ia providing 
for the ending of dual nationality. 11 70 
The conciliatory attitude exhibited by Chou En-la i 
did much to lessen the fear of China i n t he eye s of othe r 
delega t es. Nehru and others had felt that Chi na was willi ng 
to get a l ong be tter with• her neighbors, a nd this seemed to 
confir m t hi s be lief. 





The re sults of the Bandung Confer ence in terms of 
the a ims of its five sponsors , particularly ·of their three 
f oreign policy obj ec tives , were fulfil l ed. Bandung tried 
to create t he sort of environment that would serve as a 
moral res trai nt aga i nst possible Chinese t endencies of ag-
gr ess ion . This was enough to decrease the danger of war 
between China and the United States. This view was also 
he l d by Secr e tary of State John Foster Dull es. Mr. Dulles 
expressed the view in a press conference that "the situa-
t ion i n the Formosa area is becoming less hazardous--there 
i s l ess dange r of war--than in the past few months." The 
Se cr e t ary of State stated: "At the Bandung Conference, the 
Asian na t i ons have made it clear that they do not feel tha t 
the Formosa issue should be resolved by a resort to war by 
one side or the other."71 
If the United States was willing to negotia t e it 
would damage the improved reputation China had won at 
Bandung i f she resorted to force without giving negoti-
ations a fair trial. The moral restraint issued at the 
conf er ence was against Chinese ag gression or overt politi cal 
71Dul l es, Department of Sta~ Bulle tin, Vol. XXX , No. 773, 
Washington, D. c., May , 1955. 
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i nvo l vement in Southeast Asia. Chou's repeated statements 
befor e the twenty-nine nations denied any aggressive designs 
by the Chinese communists. 
Chou En-lai gave specific assurances to particular 
state s against an overt action and cooperated in inducing 
-orth Vie tnam to do the same. These statements by Chou 
we re seen as making it awkward, in terms of Asian public 
opinion , for China to take covert actions in Southeast Asia. 
It was felt, also, that the local communist parties might 
induce Peking to scale down activity in those countries 
which she courted most. 
The leaders of the five sponsoring nations believed 
that it would be easier for China, as a result of the Con-
f e rence, to develop diplomatic independence of Soviet Russia. 
For at Bandung she had emerged significantly further from 
h er previous isolation, and Chou En-lai had made her more 
acceptable to a number of states, particularly in the Near 
East. In fact, the most important country in the Near ast--
Egypt--offered diplomatic recognition a year later as a 
result of the contacts made at Bandung. 
Peking ' s prospects for wider Asian-African support 
in the United Nations had been increased by Chou's efforts 
during the Conference to declare Chinq's support for the 
principles of the United Nations' Charter. 
It was also probable that his strong backing of 




some of t heir delegates tha t they might deri ve further ad-
vantage i n t hi s matter if Peking were r epr e sented on the 
Se curity Counc i l . 
The Chinese also profited by Jawaharlal Nehru's 
as sistance a t t he Conference. Also as a r esult of t he meeting, 
t he Chinese sent a cultural delegation to Burma and established 
a condulate-general at Lashio, in North Burma. Nepal and 
Af ghani stan established diplomatic r e lations with the Red 
Chinese in 1955. 
Chou En-lai was also active in making friends wi th 
o l d enemi es. At the Asian-African Conference, Chou gave a 
dinner for Romulo, the chief Philippine delegate , and Prince 
Wan Waithayakon, the chief Thai delegate. He also suggested 
a treaty of non-aggression with the Philippines, to show 
that the Chinese Communist had no aggressive designs against 
that country. 
As Egypt heads the Arab bloc in the Middle East 
and North Africa, special efforts were made by the Reds to 
cultivate close relations with the Egyptian delegates. The 
Egyptian Minister of Religious Foundations, Sheikh Akmed 
Hassan El Bakhouri was invited to visit Communist China, 
particularly Sinkiang where a large }oslem community lives. 
Discussions between the Chinese Communist dele-
ga tes and the Egyptian Minister .of Commerce and Industry, 
Mohammed Abon Nosseis, were held toward promoting closer 
e conomic cooperation bet~een their governments. During the 
visi t of Egyptian delegates immediately after the close of 
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the confe r ence , a three year trade treaty was signed. 
At Bandung , China moved closer to the rest of Asia , 
and Asia who se political atmosphere was less tense and whose 
l eaders wer e f or the most part less apprehensive and under-
stood one anothe r bet t er than before the Conference . And 
a t Bandung , non-Communist Asia asserted its will to be heard 
more atten t ively in the halls of world diplomacy. 
The Conference repre sented an effort by t hese coun-
tries to rega in their person~lity and international dignity 
and was an as sertion of the personality vis-a-vis the Wes t . 
This successful assertion of Asian and African 
personali ty tended to beget an increa sed greater determination 
to share more fully with the West in decisions affecting the 
interest's of their countries. It seems likely that this 
determination will, in the future, grow and endure.72 
The Bandung Conference has meant different things 
to various observers. Each view is somewhat colored by the 
individual's past experiences and by what he wishes to read 
i n to the meeting. Nehru, Pannikar and Fitzgerald saw in 
t he Conference a support of India's neutralist policy. Chou 
En-lai saw in it an opportunity to exhibit "New China" in a 
f a vorable light. Kotelawala and Wan used it to warn against 
international communism. 
Gamal Abdel Nasser perhaps viewed it in terms of 
72s imiliar opinions have been expressed by George Kahin1 op, cit. and Frank l oraes, editor Times of India, ~ombay, 
July 15, 1955. 
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f u t ure support for the nationalization of the Suez Canal. 
His l ater a c tions seem to indicate a new bravado in fac e of 
e ste r n pres sure. The smaller nations only attended as 
gue sts--not participants. They were included only to fill 
up t he s ea ts. 
Since April, 1955, many of the nations have taken 
a stronger stand against the West. Sukarno of Indonesia, 
Sayyed of Jordan, Azm of Syria, and Hassan of Yemen have all 
been more difficult in their dealings with the West. Bandung 
has certainl y s erved to encourage actions which appear to 
h ave resulted in political defeats for the democratic world. 
But have they been defeats ? Certainly they have resulted 
i n black anti-Western headlines in much of the world's press. 
Ho~ever, the best defense against communism is strong 
nationalism. 
It is far too early to judge what role the Bandung 
Confe rence will play in the twentieth century. To the con-
t emporary Western world our times are called the "Atomic Age" 
o r the "Space Age." To future historians it is more like ly 
t o be known as the Age of the Asian-African Revolution. Two-
thirds of the earth's population is engaged in a political 
and social revolution unparalleled in mod ern history. For us 
in the United States, the problem of adjusting our national 
p olicies to the changing political map of the world is far 
more important in the long run than refinements of the missile 





The speakers at the Af ro-Asian Conference spoke 
harshly of past experiences -with the ·est a nd -with the -white 
race in general. They spoke freely of co-existence and 
peaceful cooperation through the United Nat ions, but there 
-was an unmistakable pale of racism throughout the entire 
proceedings . 'rhe delegates spoke freely of the need of 
technical assistance from the more highly developed nations 
and at the same time criticised the policies that created 
economic progress. 
The majority of the representatives were well aware 
of the work and time required to build up the economy and 
improve the social life of their people. None so far have 
found the courage to risk their popularity in order to in-
stitute the changes that must come before a nation can be 
transformed into a modern state. China alone has shown a 
willingness to extract supreme sacrifices from her people 
in order to industralize. She has created a political 
state, under the name of communism, which has frightened 
even the most dedicated Marxists in the Soviet Union. 
The nations which gathered at Bandung met there in 
much the same atmosphere which surrounded the American de-
legation to Paris after the end of World War I . The same 
ilsonian opti mism, the same Wilsonian faith prevailed. The 
same disregard or underestimation of the age old forces of 
s e lf-intere st was evident at Bandung. 
The complex created at Bandung was a reaction against 
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the bi-polar ization of the world after World War II. The 
sponsors of the event felt that they could keep their nations 
from being drawn into the orbit of the West or the Communist 
bloc. They a l so felt that China was more Asian than Communist 
a nd woul d also see t he advantages of the independent foreign 
policy . they so proudly advocated. 
The extent of their misjudgement has become more 
apparent each day. "The revolt in Tibet, with its profound 
impact on Indian and Southeast Asian opinion, and the sharp 
split in the Arab world between Kassem's Iraq and Nasser's 
United Arab Republic, together may well mark the end of a 
little era of post war history . 11 73 
Now the Bandung complex is slowly and painfully 
adjusting itself to the world of realpolitik. The Bandung 
"feeling" was not destroyed by the "imperialist" which 
furnished the straw men for the opening speeches. It was 
destroyed by the same political forces which sang its praises 
so loudly and used its slogans for their own benefit. Inter-
national Communism has a long history of using the most 
expedient methods to gain favor. They have never hesitated 
to destroy in order to build political advantage for 
themselves. 
The Communist destruction of Bandung is most evident 
in the nations that figured so prominently at the meeting. 
73The Rsrnorter, "The Bnd of Bandung", New York, April 16, 




I ndonesia's President Sukarno has all but lo s t his power 
because he let the Communist become too strong in his own 
c ountry. The Indonesian Army has taken over effective 
c ontrol of the government to keep the Communist under control. 
In India, Nehru's control over the Congress Party 
has faltered because of the Chinese action in Tibet. U Nu 
o f Burma has been replaced by the commander of the Burmese 
Ar my who immediately launched a drive to mop up Communist 
insurgents who have been at war with the country since 
i ndependence in 1948 . 
And Dr . Rex De Costa of Ceylon declared that the 
situation in Tibet clearly violates the United Nations 
p rinciples of religious freedom. He was speaking to the 
1959 Assembly of t he World Veterans Federation meeting in 
Rome. He spoke, on behalf of de l egations of veterans from 
Ceylon, India, Republics of China, Korea and Viet-Nam, 
Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan and Thailand . 
An article published in New Delhi quoted President 
Na sser of the Uni ted Arab Republic as charging "A communist 
master plot to seize Iraq, split Syria and Egypt, and create 
a Red Empire in the Middle East." Nasser said that the 
" enormous Soviet good will bui lt up over three years of 
:friendship was los t in less than three weeks." The President 
t old R. h .• Karanjia , Edi tor of the Indian News magazine, Bl!_t~ 
t ha t the story of the Middle East conspiracy began when 
communists planned a coup in Syria before the merger with 
-71-
Egypt early in 1958.74 
Thus the hopes of the sponsors of the Bandung 
Confe r ence t o withdraw from the cold war have failed. Nehru 
himself a ccused the Chinese Reds of bringing the cold war to 
India. The newly independent nations of Asis and Africa 
arrived on the world scene too late to enjoy isolation. The 
more f ully developed nation states will not allow independence 
in a world in which action , however small , by any of the large 
powers has its immediate effect throughout the world . 
74R •• Karanjia, Blitz, New Delhi, April 16, 1959. 
CHAPTER VI 
COMMENT 
The Bandung Conference attracted some of the leading 
journali sts from throughout t he world. Each felt that the 
Conference represented "a sense of history." 
K. M. Pannikar, a leading Indian journalist, writing 
in the May 2, 1955 issue of The Nation, felt that the signi-
ficant fact about the Asian-African conference was that for 
t he first time Asian and African leaders conferred among 
themselves about matters of interest to their peoples and 
to the world in general." 
"The Geneva Conference on Indo-China was attended 
by France, England, and America, but not by Burma, or 
Indonesia, or India, which had at least as much interest 
in peace in this area as Britain or America." 
It is against this background that the Afro-Asian 
Conference must be viewed. The first Asian conference was 
held in New Delhi, in 1946, and was meant to indicate that 
As ia was awake. At that time, no Asian country except China 
was in a position to formulate independent views. Japan 
was under occupation. India, Burma and Indonesia were only 
on the road to freedom. The second Asian conference was held 
in ew Delhi in 1947 and was for the specific purpose of 







Thus the Bandung Conference was the first clear 
affirmation of the right of Asian and African people to an 
independent voice in the settlement of their own affairs. 
" ••• yet these desperate states have a funda-
mental unity of approach to certain major problems. The most 
obvious point is their desire to see the right of all na tions 
to freedom accepted as a general principle. All the partici-
pating states except Japan have at one time or another been 
under colonial rule. 11 75 
Some of the states, especially in Southeast Asia, 
are equally if not more apprehensive of communism than 
imperialism. However, there is no denying that for the most 
part the principle of great power protection appears to t hem 
to be nothing less than colonialism under a new guise. The 
maintenance of independence against both colonialism and 
communism is the first point on which the majority of these 
nations are united. This view of Mr. Pannikar is con-
s i stant with Nehru's: That Indian diplomacy is attempting 
to sell the uncommitted nations on its non-alignment pol icy . 
A second issue , and to Pannikar the most important 
one, is the principle of racial equality. Though the problem 
t oday is mainly confined to Africa, the Asian states are no 
less concerned, for the doctrine of Apartheid in South Afr ica 
is directed as much against Asians as against Africans. 
It should be remembered that Japan championed the 
75K. M. Pannikar, The Nat ion, p. 287. 
cause of Asian equality as long ago as 1919 at the peace 
conference in Paris. In the United Nations, India and other 
Asian countries have been fighting strenuously for the accept-
ance of the principle. To the African, it is one of the over-
riding questions. A third and equally important issue facing 
the powers that met at this time was the fear of nuclear 
weapons. "The nations which threaten each other with atomic 
and hydrogen bombs are having difficulty enough to provide 
for protection against the effects of explosions. The nations 
of As ia and Africa are altogether helpless. 11 76 These nations 
see themselves threatened with annihilation in a war which 
they do not consider their own and in which they do not want 
to become involved. 
Another view of the Asian-African Conference was 
expressed by C. P. Fitzgerald a faculty member of the 
Australian Na t ional University and author of Reyolution in 
China. 
"The Afro-Asian Conference represents the most 
positive expression so far achieved of the Indian policy of 
non-alignment. 11 77 The independent nations of Asia and the 
few independent states of Africa met to settle the causes of 
friction between them and to demonstrate to the West that 
Asia was well able to handle its own affairs. 
Fitzgerald said that although the former colonial 
76Jbid., p. 289. 
77c . P. Fitzgerald, ,!he Nation, p. 288. 
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p owers are resigned with more or less good grace to the in-
d ependence of the ir colonie s , they a r e stil l r e luctant to 
admi t t hat they are no longer needed to run their foreign 
a ffai r s. He feels that the West is obsessed wi th the dra-
ma t ic clash of communism with capi t alism , and i s i mpa t ient 
with t he theory of non- alignme nt in the st.ruggle aga i ns c 
c owruu.nism . .J.1. t.h~ ~ouin..cie s which adhere t.o non-alignme nt 
vJ e r e , i n fact , t o be i nvaded by a ggre s sive communists , t he 
es t woul d have to come t o their a id not f rom affection, but 
from fear of any incr ease i n ~ommunist s t rengt.h. 
'l'he 1ndian view, represented at the Conference by 
ehru, would not deny that this situation could arise. I t 
claims tha t the possibility of such a situation happening is 
made more r emote by the po l icy of non-alignment. The 
difference i n view stems ultimately from a diff erent 
as se ssment of the forces behind Asiatic Communism. The 
e s t easily as sumes that China's motives are closely allied 
with those of the Sovie t Union; the Asians see China primarily 
a s one of themselves, an Asian people tha t has achieved 
independence and strength. This strength was not achieved 
i n t he way Asia would like , but none the less an example to 
them all. The India s, therefore , believe tha t China has 
limited objectives which can be realized without prejudice 
to the r est of Asia , and that it has legitimate grievances 
which should be red r essed by t he offending powers ~hich have 





Norman Cousins, editor of The Saturday Review, 
journeyed to bandung for an eyewitness account of the pro-
c eedings. He called the opening ceremonies "the graduation 
exercises of two continents--graduation into equality in the 
family of free nations. 11 78 
He went on to say that the most remarkable thing 
a bout the Asian-African Conference was the sense of history 
it represented and reflected. The nations at Bandung 
possessed as large a variety of political views and cultural 
and religious backgrounds as exists anywhere in the world; 
yet all the delegates seemed to fe el they were part of one 
vast idea to which each was paying homage. The work of the 
c onference, the public and private sessions, the general 
statement which required so many hours of debate and com-
p r omise--all this was minor compared to the symbolic 
significance of the event. 
The process of breaking loose from colonial rule 
had been celebrated, but now for the first time, all at 
once and in a single place, more than one billion three 
hundred million human beings, who had achieved freedom, 
were observing the total event. It created a sense of 
exhultation and kinship difficult to describe. The his-
torical momentum was so great that it affected almost 
78Norman Cousins, The Saturday Review, May 21, 1955, pp. 7-8. 
i I 
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e verything that was said or done. 
Most of the delegates had a single answer for the 
question that was put before them at the end of the Con-
f e rence: "What would you say was the principal signifi-
cance of Bandung?" Their answer in one form or another: 
" The fact that is was held. 11 79 Triumphs or defeats over 
conference statements were lost alongside the mountainous 
fact that each person present gloried in the historical 
aura of the occasion. 
The men at Bandung marked their freedom, but there 
wa s neither gloating over the event nor the eruptive release 
of resentment towards their former captors or governors. 
Ca rlos • Romulo keynoted the spirit of the meeting when he 
s aid: "The success of this Conference will be measured not 
by what we do for ourselves, but what we do for the whole human 
community. It is the cause not only of Asia and Africa, it 
is the cause of the human community in a world struggling to 
l iberalize itself from the chaos of international anarchy. 
In short, our cause is the cause of man." Romulo called on 
the delegates to use their perception of history and their 
vital purposes toward the making of a better tomorrow. 
"Finally, the key to Asia and Africa is in our own 
history. The closer we get to the real meaning of what 
happened in America 183 years ago, the easier it may be to 
understand the dominant accent of the t~entieth century. The 
791..gj,g_. 
~·~ -- ... 
I 
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d O prominently, 
of Asia , in which America figure s 
th t f B dung We 
Sti l l have a place on 
l i be rat ion 
he l ped se t 
that stage. n80 
e s age or an • 
Off icial 
ference wa s voiced 
d con 
United State s support of the Ban ung -
in 47 languages through the 78 trans-
mitters of the Voice of America. The fo llowing eye-witness 
a c count was written by Barry Zorthian, Program Director for 
the Voice of America, and broadcast i n April, 1955: 
There is little doubt about the histori?al s i~~i~i-
ficance of this conference a s the first in which pha rld 
Pants are limited only to nations from areas oft e wo 
which
1 
short years ago, were centers of colonia lism,£ 
And it may well be that simply the coming together 
0 
delega t es will be the major significance of the con1 
fe rence . Certainly it will be extremely difficult n 1 
six short days to do more than exchange views of mutua 
problems and agree on some general principles. 
The atmosphere and festive spirit in Bandung, bo
t h 
among de l ega te s themselve s and the ordinary peo~le ~f 
lndone sia , shows how important is this pride. The Gon-
f erence has symbolism to Asians and Africans--a f ee ling 
that now they have emerged to full partnership in the 
wor ld politica l picture . 
This feeling is based on many aspects of thi s con-
ference. lt is 'our' conference to the people here . l t 
i s ' our' preparations which produced the machinery f or 
the conference . These are 'our' leaders; important 
world news is being made by us. You correspondents 
from the west are our guests . 
Certainly these f eelings are natura l and perhap s 
i nevi table . But it is a lso important to note that the 
basis for this pride did not result from the present con-
ference . • • 
The conference may be a concrete symbol of t he role 
Asians and Africans play i n world affairs but tha t r ole 
has developed over the years . ' 
The r eason for the emotional and deep f elt con-




be found i n t he dramatic suddennes s with whi ch these two 
continents have emerged i n world a f fair s . Ten short 
Years a go, this conference could not have been held, 
certainly no t on t he pr e s ent basis. The five sponsoring 
powers-- India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and l~dones i a--
were under Br iti sh or Dutch control; t he Phi lippines 
was sti ll a commonwealth, Viet am, Cambodia and Laos 
were French colonies. J apan was on t he verge of sur-
r ende r a nd occupati on •thiopia was occupied, and other 
nations in the 1 i ddle'East were under f oreign domi na tion 
or direct contro1. 11 Bl 
Many observers l ooked on the Conference as a pro-
bable battle -ground between Chou En-lai and Nehru. "Chou 
had demonstrated a t Geneva that he is one of the world's 
mo St accompl ished diplomatists. At Bandung, he taught the 
cla s s a l esson on t he timing of diplomatic moves, Halfway 
through the Conference , just when it was necessary to remind 
everyone how obl iging he could be, Chou signed a trea ty with 
1 nd0nes1a which ca lled upon Chinese l i v i ng in lndones ia to 
de cide whe ther they wishes to be Chinese or I ndonesians. 
Ever since the Ching dynasty Chinese Governments have always 
con sidered Chinese born anywhere, and no matter what their 
adopted nationality, to be Chinese. 11 82 
The timing was designed to influence the other Asian 
de l e gate s , most of which had Chinese minority problems within 
the ir own countries . 
Interpretations of the Afro-Asian Conference are 
as numerous as were delegates and observers. 
blB Z arry orthi an, Asian-African ommentary i l centr a l ~rogram 
Service s Division, Voice of America. ' 
82 Alex Josey, "Looking .Back at Bandung , " Eastern \ orld., 
London, June 1955, p. 17. 
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The General Secretary of the Communist ~arty of 
India , Ajoy Ghosh, saw Bandung as a struggle between two op-
P osing forces. "Un one side was the might of resurgent Asia, 
a nd on the other, ranged against it, were those who wanted 
Asia to line up behind the imperialists . 1183 Communists and 
fre emen alike, however, recognized the significance that it 
'Was "the "first Confe r ence where representatives of Asian and 
Afr i can peoples not only came toge ther and discussed their 
O'Wn problems, but also took certain decisions which would 
h e lp them cha l k out their own future. 1184 Whereas Ghosh saw 
the Conference as a victorious phase in the battle against 
i mperialists which began at Dien Bien ~hu, other more his-
t orically minded writers have s een it as a milestone in the 
long evolution of wes tern l i beralism. 
un December 26, 1957, a conference billed as The 
Afro - Asian ~eople's Solidarity Conference conviened in Cairo. 
This was an unofficial conference which was attended by dele-
ga tions from many of the nations which took part at Bandung 
and the addition of one more--Soviet Russia. 
The Soviets have repeatedly tried to be included 
i n the As ian section of the Afro-Asian bloc. Yevgeny Zhukov 
-was the Soviet delegate to Cairo of which he wrote: "The 
Cairo Conference will undoubtedly occupy a place of honour in 
the history of the great progressive movements of our 
83 
Ajoy Ghosh, "The 
New Century 
84-I bid. , p. 15. 
Bandung Conference," Poli t1cal Affairs., 
ublishers, Inc., New York, June 1955, P• 13. 
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t i me • u85 He went on to describe the events which followed 
t he Bandung Confe r ence as having "wrought great chanees in 
- f r ica and As i a. The f orce s of progress have grown stronger 
a na i ncreased in number. I mperialism's efforts to prop up 
t h e o l d , doomed world--the world of violence , oppression ao<l 
c o l on i al slavery--are destined to failure. Cairo, the 
successor t o Bandung, is clear proof of this. 1186 Despite 
t he ovie t wri t er's enthuastic support of the Cairo meeting 
the governments of India and Indonesia disavowed any con-
nec t i on or support of the meeting. 
Three noted American writers have recently written 
a rticle s on the subject of neutralism and the U.S. policy 
t owa r d the concept. Henry A. issinger in Nuclear Weapons 
and 'ore ign olicy said: 
85y 
The importance •Of U.S. leadership is all the grea t er 
because many of the leaders of the newly independent 
nations have so little understanding of international 
relations and of the nature of power. Although they 
distinguished themselves in the struggle with the former 
colonial powers, the independence movements, almost 
without excep tion, provided a poor preparation for an 
und er s tanding of the element of power in international 
r e lations. Based on the dogmas of late nineteenth-
century libe r alis, especially its pacifism, the in-
dependence movements relied more or ideological agree-
ment than on an evaluation of power factor s , and to 
this day the claim to superior spirituality remains 
the ba ttl e cry of Asian nationalism. 
It is imperative that the uncommitted powers 
understand not only the benefits but also the duties of 
independence. Iv1any of the leaders of the newly independent 
evgeny Zhukov, "From Bandung to Cairo" International 
Affair~, Soviet Society For the Popularization of 
Political and Scientific Knowledge. Moscow, 
February 1958, p. 52. 
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states have found the t emptation to phlal ! mag~r role 
in international affairs almost overw em ng. 
Unless t he newly independent nations learn that 
every action has a price in the international field as well, 
they will increasingly seek to play a global role that is 
beyond either their s t rength or the risks they are willing 
to assume. 
Reinhold Niebuhr ob j ected to t he over emphasis on 
military pacts by u.s. leade rship in an ar ticle in TlliLJ~ 
Leade r~ 
Frequently our emphasis of militar y pacts and 
s trategic geography often paints a distorted picture 
of t he u.s . in the minds of Asians, a picture which 
to a large degree conforms to the slogans of Communism 
propaganda. While the U. S. is one of the few na tions 
in history without an imperialist background, we are 
now grouped together with the mil itarists of Prussia 
and Japan. One of the reasons for this predicament is 
our reli anc e on our obvious military superiority t o 
ge t us out of situations which we could have avoided 
wi th fore s ight. When we get into s erious difficulty 
we r e l y on our power of r e ta l iation . We are ther efore 
tempted to an undue r eliance on the obvi ous mi gh t we 
poss ess, particularly since our appr ent i ceship in the 
leadershi p of world affairs has been brief, and we 
have not had time to accustom ourselves to t he acquisi-
tion, and to know the importance of prestige as a 
source of power; or to learn pa t ience with t he endless 
complexities of loyalties and r e sentments of trad itions 
and established f orms of cohe sion whi ch gover n the 
actions of nations •••• 
We are preoccupied with our ' def ense perimeter' 
in As ia and have litt le interest i n the vast political 
complexities of the grea t continent except to express 
consistent contempt for the gr ea t uncommitted nat ion , 
I ndia, though tha t country 's neutralism i s not informed 
85 
Henry A. Kissinger, · uclear Weapons and Fore ign Polic.Y 
ew York: Doubleday Anchor Books, I nc., 1958. ' 
-83-
by th f Sympathy for Communism. 86 e slightest degree o 
In an article titled "Neutrality: Varying Tunes" 
Iiamilton Fish Armstrong described neutralism as a "jumble of 
Wishful, hopeful, opportunitistic but not necessarily un-
fri endly propositions: 1187 
All in all the term neutralism as it is being used 
in politica l dis6ussion today is something quite different 
from what it has meant traditionally in the textbooks of 
i n t er national Jaw and thus probably from what it was in the 
mi nd of Secretary Dulles--the lawyer. 
To the wide-ranging leaders today who proclaim 
their ind ependence, neutrality is not a declaration in 
advance of a fixed position to be taken in case of war, 
or a claim to right against belligerent encroachment. It 
is a political expedient. It is not passive but active. 
It asse rts that each state is determined to go its own 
independent way in accordance with its own current 
estimate of its own interests; and it expresses t he 
hope of getting along with both sides and even of serving 
as a bridge to bring them closer together. In other 
words, it is a jumble of wishful, hopeful, opportunistic 
but not necessarily unfriendly propositions. 
The success of the communists in appealing to the 
Underdeveloped nations of the world has its roots in Western 
colonialism. The active support of feudal classes, slavery 
and nationalistic backwardness by European colonial powers 
has resulted in a long and tortuous default. It is only in 
this context that the successes of Soviet and Red Chinese 
communism in the underdeveloped countries can be understood. 
he West has failed to show non-Western peoples a sensible 
86 
Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Limits of ilitary Power" The New 
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way to become industralized . China and India have become the 
Pivot of the world. India is fumbling for a way out of 
centuries of poverty. China, under communist rule, is clearly 
a d vancing towards industralization. What has taken the Soviets 
forty Years to accomplish may be in reach of the Chinese in 
twenty. 
the 
In those areas still outside the communist yoke 
est has yet to put forward a program for economic devel-
0 Pment . India, Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia are searching for a solution other than communism. That 
communism may not ser ve thi s cause any better than capitalism 
is not the major point. The point is that the communists 
may well win the world struggle without firing a single missile 
or a single atomic bomb. Karl Marx remar ked in 1853 : "Im-
potence expresses itself in a single proposition: the main-
tenance of the status quo . 11 88 
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C • Wright Mills, The Causes Sf Wor ld \ ar Three, Simon and 
Schuster: ew York , 195 , p . 73 . 
TEXT OF ...Il.li~L COMMUNI ~UE 
The Asian-African Conference , convened by the 
Governments of Burma , Ceylon, Ind i a , Indonesia and Pakistan, 
met in Bandung from the 18th to 24 th of April , 1955. 
In addition to the sponsoring countries, the fol-
lowing twenty-four countrie s participated i n the conference : 
/ , 
Af ghanistan, Cambodia , the People's Republic of 
Ch ina , Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast , Iran , I r aq, Japan , 
Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia , Li bya , Nepa l , the Philippines , 
0 audi Arabia, the Sudan, Syri a , Thailand , Turkey , t he Demo-
c r a t i c Republic of (North) Vie tnam , t he Sta t e of Vietnam 
a nd Yemen. 
The Asian- Afr ican Conference considered the position 
of sia and Africa a nd discussed ways and means by which 
t heir peoples could achi eve the f ullest economic , cultural 
and politica l coope r ation. 
A. ECO 01 I C COOP~RATION: 
1 . The Asian-African Conference recogni zed t he 
urgency of promoting economic development i n the Asian-
African region. Ther e was general desire for economi c co-
ope ration among the participating countrie s on the basi s of 
mu t ual interest and respect for national sovereignty. 
The proposals with regard to economic cooper ation 
within t he participati ng countries do not pr eclude ei ther 
the desirabil ity or t he need for cooperation with countries 
-85-
0 uts 1de the region , i nc l ud i ng the inves tment of f or eign 
c a p 1 tal. 
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It was f urthe r r ecognized that assis t ance being re-
ce ived by certain participa ting countries from out side the 
region through i nter national or under bi l a teral arr angements 
had made a valuable contribution to the i mplementation of 
the ir development programs. 
2 . The parti cipating countries agreed t o provide 
t echnica l assistance to one another to the maximum extent 
Practicable, in the form of: 
Experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment 
for demons tra tion purposes, exchange of know-how, and 
e sta blishment of national and, where possible, regional 
training and r e s earch institutes for imparting technical 
knowledge and skills in cooperation with the existing 
international agencies . 
3. The Asian-African Conference r ecommended: 
The ear l y establishment of a special United Nations 
fund fo r economic development; 
The allocation by the International Bank for Re-
constructi on and Development of a greater part of its re-
sources to Asian-African countries; 
The early establishment of an international f inance 
corporation, which should include in its activities the 
undertaking of equity investment; and 
ncouragement of the promotion of joint ventures 
among Asian-hfrican countries in so f ar as this wi l l promote 
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the i r common interes t. 
4. The As ian-Afric an Conference r ecognized the 
Vi ta l need f or s t abilizing commodity trade in the region. 
The principl e of enlarging the scope of multi-
l ateral trade and payments wa s accepted. However, it was 
recogni zed t hat s ome countrie s would have to take recourse 
to bilater al trad e arrangements i n view of their prevailing 
economic cond i tions. 
5. The Asian-African Conference recommended t ha t 
col lec t i ve a ction be t aken by participating countries for 
stabilizing i nte r national prices of and demand for primary 
commodities through bilateral and multila tera l arrangements, 
and t ha t as far as practicable and desirable they should 
adop t a unified approach on the subject in the United Nations 
Pe rmanent Advi sory Commission on International Commodity 
Trade and othe r international forums. 
6. The Asian-African Conference further recom-
mended : 
Asian-African countries should diversify their 
export t rad e by processing their raw materials whenever 
economicall y feasible before export; intra-regional trade 
f a irs should be promoted and encouragement be given to the 
exchange of trade delegations and groups of businessmen; 
exchange of information and of samples should be en-
coura ged with a view to promoting intra-regional trade; 
and normal facilities should be provided for the transit 
trad e of l andlocked countries. 
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7. The Asian-African Conference attached con-
siderable importance to shipping and expressed concern tha t 
shipping line s reviewed from time to time their freight 
rates, which are often to the detriment of participating 
countries. It recommended a study of this problem and 
Collective action thereafter to induce the shipping lines 
to adopt a more reasonable attitude . I t wa s further sug-
ge s ted that a study of railway freight of transit trade may 
be made. 
8. The Asian-African Conference agreed that en-
couragement should be given to the establishment of national 
and r egional banks and insurance companies. 
9. The Asian-African Conference f elt that exchange 
of information on matters relating to oil, such as remittance 
of profits and taxation, might eventually lead to the formu-
lation of a common policy . 
10. The Asian-African Conf erence empha sized the 
Particular significance of the development of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes for Asian-African countries. 
The Conference welcomed the initiative of the 
powers principally concerned in offering to make available 
information regarding the us e of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes; urged the speedy establishment of an inter-
national atomic energy agency which should provide for 
adequate representation of the Asian-African countries on 
the executive authority of the agency; and recommended tha t 
Asian and African governments take full advantage of the 
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training and other facilities in the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy offered by the countries sponsoring such programs. 
11. The Asian-African Conference agreed to the 
appointment of liaison officers in participating countries, 
to be nominated by their respective national governments, 
for the exchange of information and ideas on matters of 
mutual interest. 
It recommended that fuller use should be made of 
the existing international organizations, and participating 
countries who were not members of such international organi-
zations, but were eligible, should secure membership. 
12 . The Asian-African Conference recommended tha t 
there should be prior consultation of participating coun-
tries in interna t ional forums with a view, as far as possible, 
to furthering their mutual economic interest. It is, however, 
not intended to form a regional bloc. 
B. CULTURAL COOPERATION. 
l . The Asian-African Conference was convinced 
that among the most powerful means of promoting understanding 
among nations is the development of cultural cooperation. 
Asia and Africa have been the cradle of great religions and 
civilizations, which have enriched other cultures and 
civilizations while themselves being enriched in the process. 
Thus the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on 
spiritual and universal foundations. Unfortunate ly, cul-
tural contacts among Asian and African countries were 
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interrupted during the past centuries. 
The peoples of Asia and Africa are now animated by 
a keen and sincere desire to renew their old cultural contact s 
a nd develop new ones in the context of the modern wor l d. All 
Participating governments at the Asian-African Conference re-
i t e rated their determination to work for closer cultural 
c ooperation. 
2. The Asian-African Conference took note of the 
fact that the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia 
a nct Africa, in whatever form it may be, not only prevents 
c ultural cooperation but also suppresses the national cul-
tures of the peoples. 
Some colonial powers have denied their dependent 
p eop l es basic rights in the sphere of education and culture, 
~hich hampers the development of their personality and also 
p r events cultural intercourse with other Asian and African 
people s . 
This is particularly true in the case of Tunisia, 
lgeri a and orocco, where the basic right of the people to 
study their own language and culture have been suppressed. 
Similar discrimination has been practiced against 
As ian and colored peoples in some parts of the Continent of 
Africa. 
The Conference felt that these policies amounted 
t o a denial of the fundamental rights of man, impede cul-
t ural advancement in this region and also hamper cultural 
coope ration on the wider international plane. The 
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Ca n..r e r e nce condemned such a denial of fundamental rights 
t n the sphere of education and culture in some parts of Asia 
a nd Africa by this and other forms of cultural suppression . 
l n 
Particular, the Conference condemned racialism as a means 
Of cultural suppression. 
3. It was not from any sense of exclusiveness or 
rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilizations 
a nd cultures that the Conference viewed the development of 
c u l tural cooperation among Asian and African countries. 
True to the age-old tradition of tolerance and 
Universality, the Conference believed that Asian and African 
c ultural cooperation should be developed in the larger context 
o f worJdcooperation. Side by side with the development of 
As ian-African cultural cooperation, the countries of Asia and 
Af rica desire to develop cultural contacts with others. This 
~ould enrich their own culture and would also help in the 
P romotion of world peace and understanding. 
4. There are many countries in Asia and Africa 
Wh i ch have not yet been able to develop their educational, 
s cientific and technical institutions. The Conference re-
commended that countries in Asia and Africa which are more 
fo rtuna tely placed in this respect should give facilities 
fo r the admission of students and trainees from such coun-
tries to their institutions. Such facilities should also 
be made available to the Asian and African people in Africa, 
to ~hom opportunities for acquiring higher education are at 
p r e sent denied. 
-92-
5. The Asian-African Conference felt that the 
Promotion of cultural cooperati on among countries of Asia and 
Afr ica should be directed towards : 
country; 
First, the acquis i tion of knowledge of each other's 
Second, mutual cultural exchange ; and 
Third, exchange of i nformati on. 
6. The As ian-African Confe r ence was of the opinion 
t ha t a t this stage the best r esults in cultural cooper a t ion 
would be achieved by pursuing bilateral a r r angements to 
implement its recommendations and by each country taking 
action on its own wherever po ssible and f easible • 
.Q,_. HU 1AN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETI:RHi l'JATI ON~ 
1. The Asian-African Confer ence declared its full 
support of the fundamental principl es of human rights as a 
common standard of achievement for a l l peopl es and al l 
nations. The Conference declared its full support of the 
Pri nciple of self-determination of peoples and nations as 
set forth in the Charter of t he United Nations and took not e 
Of the United Nations resolutions on the right of peoples 
ana nations to self-deter mination, which i s a pr er equisite 
of the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights. 
2. The Asian-African Conference deplored the pol i c ies 
ana practices of racial segregation and discrimination whi ch 
form the basis of government and human r elations in l arge 
regions of Africa and in other parts of the world . Such 
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conduct is not only a gross violation of human rights, but 
also a denial of the fundamental value of civi l ization and 
the dignity of man. 
The Conference extended its warm sympathy and 
support f or the courageous stand taken by the victims of racial 
discrimination and especially by the peoples of African and 
Indian and Pakistani origin in South Africa; applauded all 
those who sustained their cause; reaffirmed the determina-
tion of Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of 
racialism that might exist in their own countries; and 
Pledged to use its full moral influence to guard against 
the danger of falling victims to the same evi l in their 
struggle to eradicate it. 
Q_, PROBLEMS OF DEPENDENT PEOPLE. 
1. The Asian-African Conference discussed the 
Problems of dependent peoples and colonialism and the evils 
arising from subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation. The Conference agreed: 
First, in declaring that colonialism in all its 
manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought 
to an end· 
' 
Second, . in affirming that the subjection of peoples 
to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes 
a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the 
Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the 
Promotion of world peace and cooperation; 
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Third, in declaring its support of the cause of 
freedom and independence for all such peoples; and 
Fourth, in calling upon the powers concerned to 
grant freedom and independence to such peoples. 
2. In view of the unsettled situation in North 
Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North 
Africa of their right to self-determination, the Asian-
African Conference declared its support of the rights of 
the people of Algeria , iforocco and Tunisia to self-deter-
mination and independence and urged the French Government 
to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without 
delay. 
E. OTHER PROBLEMS. 
l. In view of the existing tension in the Middle 
East caused by the situation in alestine and of the danger 
of that tension to world peace , the Asian-African Conference 
declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of 
Palestine, and called for the implementation of the United 
Na tions resolutions on Palestine and of the peaceful 
settlement of the Palestine question. 
2. The Asian-African Conference, in the context 
of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, 
supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West 
Irian, based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia 
and the Ietherlands. The Asian-African Conference urged 
the Netherlands Government to reopen negotiations as soon 
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as Possible to implement their obligations under the above-
mentioned agreements and expressed the earnest hope that the 
United J ations could assist the parties concerned in finding 
a Peaceful solution to the dispute. 
3. The Asian-African Conference supported the 
Position of Yemen in the case of Aden and the southern parts 
of Yemen known as the protectorates, and urged the parties 
concerned to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute • 
.E_, PR0 10TION OF WORLD PEACE AND COOPERATIOl . 
1. The Asian-African Conference, taking note of 
the fact that several states have still not been admitted 
to the United Nations, considered that, for effective 
cooperation for world peace, membership in the United Nations 
should be universal, called on the Security Counsil to support 
the admission of all those states which are qualified for 
membership in terms of the Charter. 
In the opinion of the Asian-African Conference the 
following among the participating countries which were 
represented in it--Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, 
Libya, Nepal and a unified Vietnam--were so qualified. 
The Conference considered that the representation 
of the countries of the Asian-African region on the Security 
Council in relation to the principle of equitable geo-
graphical distribution was inadequate. It expressed the 
View that, as regards the distribution of the non-permanent 
seats, the Asian-African countries which, under the 
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arrangement arrived at in London in 1946, are precluded 
from b e ing elected, should be enabled to serve on the Security 
Council so that they mi gh t make a more eff ective contri-
bution to the maintenance of i nternational peace and security . 
2. The Asian-Afric an Conference having cons idered 
t he dangerous situation of international tension exi s ting 
a nd the risks confronting the whole human race from the out-
break of global war in which the destructive power of al l 
type s of armaments, including nuclear and thermonuclear 
weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of all 
nations to the terrible consequences tha t would fol l ow if 
such a war were to break out. 
The Conference considered tha t disarmament and 
the prohibition of production, experimentation and use of 
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war are i mperative to 
save mankind and civilization from the fear and prospect of 
wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of 
As ia and Africa assembled here have a duty toward humanity 
and civilization to proclaim their support f or the pro-
hibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations princi-
pally concerned and to world opinion to bri ng about such 
disarmament and prohibition. 
The Conference consid ered that effe ctive inter-
nationa l control should be established and ma intained to 
impl ement such prohibition and that speedy and determined 
efforts should be made to this end. Pending the total 
prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and t hermonuclear 
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weapons, this Conference appealed to all the powers con-
cerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such 
weapons. 
The Conference declared that universal disarma-
ment is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace 
and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and 
appealed to all concerned speedily to bring about the re-
gulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed 
forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the 
production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass 
destruction, and to establish effective international control 
to this end. 
3. The Asian-African Conference gave anxious 
thought to the question of world peace and cooperation. It 
viewed with deep concern the present state of international 
tension with its danger of an atomic world war. 
The problem of peace is correlative with the 
problem of international security. In this connection all 
states should cooperate especially through the United Nations 
in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimi-
nation of nuclear weapons under effective international 
control. In this way international peace can be promoted 
and nuclear energy may be used exclusively for peaceful 
purposes. This would help answer the needs, particularly 
of Asia and Africa, for what they urgently require are 
social progress and better standards of life in larger free-
dom. 
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Freedom and peace are interdependent. The right 
of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples in 
freedom, and independence must be granted with the least 
Possible delay to those who are still dependent peoples. 
Indeed all nations should have the right freely to choose 
their own political and economic systems and their own way 
of life in conformity with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
Free from distrust and fear and with confidence and 
goodwill toward each other , nations should practice tolerance 
and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors 
and develop friendly cooperation on the basis of the following 
Principles: 
1 . Respect for fundamental human rights and for 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations . 
2 . Respect for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all nations. 
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and 
of the equality of all nations , large and small. 
4. Abstention from intervention or interference 
in the internal affairs of another country . 
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend 
itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter 
of the United Nations . 
6. a. Abstention from the use of arrangements of 
collective defense to serve the particular interests of any 
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of t he bi g powers, b. Abstention by any country f r om exerting 
Pressures on other countries. 
7. Refraining from acts or t hr eats of aggression of 
the use of force against the t erritorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any country. 
8. Settlement of all international disputes by 
Peaceful means such as negotia tion, conci l iation, arbitra t ion, 
or judicial settlement, as well as other peaceful means of 
the parties' own choice in conformity with t he Charter of the 
United Na t ions . 
9. Pr omot ion of mutual interest and cooperation . 
10. Respect for justice and i nternational obli-
gations. 
The Asian-Afr ican Conference declares its convic-
t i on that friendly cooperation in accord ance with these 
principles would effectively contribute to the maintenance 
and promotion of international peace and s ecurity, while 
coopera t ion in the economic, social and cultural field would 
he l p bring about the common prosperity and well-being of a l l . 
The Asian- Afr ican Conference recommended that 
the five sponsoring countries consider the convening of the 
next meeting of the Conference in consultation with the 
participating countries. 
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